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Does local democracy help or hinder the solution of collective action problems?
We study this question in the context of public spending on health-related urban
amenities in a panel of 75 municipal boroughs in England and Wales in 1868, 1871
and 1886. We nd evidence of a U-shaped relationship between spending on ur-
ban amenities and the extension of the local voting franchise. We argue that this
retrenchment e¤ect arose because middle class taxpayers were unwilling to pay the
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The principle of constructive rating ..... has had the e¤ect of throwing
a great deal of power in the hands of the smaller voters in urban districts,
which power, I am sorry to say, they do not exercise upon very enlightened
principles; and unless there was the counterpose of rural voting for the benet
of the owners of property, I think that sanitary improvements would very soon
be brought to a stand still in many urban districts. (The Select Committee
on the Poor Law Guardians of 1878 as quoted by Keith-Lucas, 1952, p. 70).
1 Introduction
Does local democracy help or hinder the solution of collective action problems? How does
the allocation of voting rights in local elections matter for provision of local public goods?
Can the extension of the voting franchise be a source of retrenchment rather than of expan-
sion of public spending? These century old questions are still highly relevant in todays
world.1 This paper provides some new answers by taking a historical perspective. We
study theoretically and econometrically the role of local democracy in solving collective
action problems in mid-Victorian cities in England and Wales. This context provides a
promising testing ground for three related reasons. Firstly, mid-Victorian cities urgently
needed to invest in urban infrastructure, sanitation and other health-related urban ameni-
ties to make up for the under-investment in the urban economy earlier in the century.2
Secondly, this challenge fell almost exclusively on local government. Beginning in the late
1860s, local authorities across England and Wales were investing in urban amenities, at
rst in clean water and later on, in sewers, local transportation, and gas works, on an
unprecedented scale.3 Thirdly, these improvements did not happen over-night, nor did
they happen at the same time in all cities. Much depended on who had gained control
of the Municipal Corporation (borough council) which by 1870 had emerged as the main
provider of urban amenities in many boroughs. This, in turn, depended on the allocation
1See Santos (1998) and Bardhan (2000) for a discussion of the merits of decentralization of provision of
public goods and World Bank (2000) and Chattopadhyay and Duo (2004) for a discussion of the merits
of creating opportunities for participation in local politics of disenfranchised groups.
2See Williamson (1990, chapter 10) or Szreter (1997) for a discussion of under-investment in local
public goods before 1860. Szreter and Mooney (1998) show that despite rising real wages, life expectancy
at birth was higher in many urban areas in 1821 than in 1871 thus testifying to the deteriorating urban
environment.
3See Millward (2001, p. 315) and Bell and Millward (1998).
2
of voting rights within the borough, i.e., on the extension of the franchise governing local
elections.
Economic historians, such as Hennock (1963, 1970) and Szreter (1988, 1997), have
emphasized the role of political factors in understanding why some cities managed to nd
solutions to the public health crisis more e¤ectively and faster than others. They identify
the power struggle between "economists" and "sanitarists" as a key factor. Sanitarists
argued for public investments in health related public amenities, whereas economists
wanted to economize on the level of city spending.4 The outcome of this struggle was, in
turn, related to the extension of the voting franchise which varied a lot from borough to
borough. This historical narrative has an important testable implication that we call the
retrenchment hypothesis. It suggests that spending on urban amenities was relatively low
in boroughs with a moderately extended franchise because this allowed lower middle class
economists to control the boroughs. In contrast, in boroughs in which the franchise
put the urban elite and the sanitarists in charge action was taken to solve the under-
investment problem.
The narrative, however, leaves two questions open. First, why did the allocation of
voting rights di¤er from borough to borough? Second, does an extension of the franchise
necessarily cause retrenchment? To gain insights into these questions, we develop a the-
ory of taxpayer democracy.5 The theory provides a simple, but compelling, explanation
for the uneven extension of the franchise across cities and shows that the retrenchment
hypothesis is more likely to hold in cities with high wealth inequality and a small middle
class. We also show that enfranchisement of the middle class can be a Pareto improve-
ment, but only if spending on local public goods increases as a consequence. The theory,
therefore, implies that the source of middle class retrenchment (i.e., a fall in spending) is
4See also Fraser (1976), O¤er (1981), Wohl (1983) and Daunton (2001, chapter 9).
5Recent research on the extension of the voting franchise has stressed the threat of revolution (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2001, Conley and Temini, 2001), conict within the elite about assignment of rents
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004), gradual alienation of the disenfranchised (Justman and Gradstein, 1999), and
constitutional exchange (Congleton, 2004) as four reasons why voting rights were granted in Western Eu-
rope during the nineteenth century. Our theory adds to this literature by modelling democratization as
an exchange of political inuence for tax revenues. Although this approach in itself cannot explain why
nation-wide franchise reforms, such as the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869, were agreed, it does provide
useful insights into the sources of spatial variation in the extension of the franchise across boroughs.
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forced enfranchisement of the middle class occurring through nation-wide reforms. These
results allow us to use the theory constructively to develop a proper empirical test of the
retrenchment hypothesis.
The main contribution of the paper is an empirical test of the retrenchment hypothesis.
We make use of a new panel data set on spending on urban amenities by (up to) 75
Municipal Corporations in England andWales in 1868, 1871 and 1886. Our results support
the retrenchment hypothesis. We nd that democratization would have led to a reduction
in spending on urban amenities in boroughs where less than 40 per cent of the adult male
population could vote, and to an expansion in boroughs with a wider franchise than that.
The 40 per cent turning point is approximately in the middle of the sample.
These results suggest that capture by local elites, which is generally considered a
cost of decentralized provision of public goods (see, e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000),
can be a force of improvement in situations, as in nineteenth century urban England and
Wales, where the private interest of the local elite is aligned with general development
goals. On the other hand, our results also show that local democratic institutions, even
when they operate well and provide accountability and voice as intended, can be a force of
retrenchment when the power falls into the hands of groups that do not wish to spend on
public goods. In fact, this can be seen as a counter-example to Directors law, as public
expenditure on urban amenities did not primarily benet the middle class and expansion of
local government spending was driven mainly by the urban elite, not by the middle class.6
Finally, our results challenge the view that enfranchisement of citizens with below-average
income must lead to an expansion of public spending and show that it is often wrong.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the institutional background.
In section 3, we introduce the retrenchment hypothesis. In section 4, we develop the model.
In section 5, we discuss the data, our empirical strategy and present the results. In section
6, we conclude. Discussion of the data material and sources can be found in the Appendix
which also contains some proofs. A separate Appendix with a detailed discuss of the
robustness of the theory and of the empirical results can be found at the end of the paper.
6Stigler (1970) in his classical discussion of Directors Law was, of course, well aware that the politics
and the public nances of the nineteenth century often did not lead to redistribution to the middle class.
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2 Institutional Background
During the nineteenth century, local government in urban England and Wales consisted
of a range of di¤erent elected or appointed authorities7, with overlapping boundaries, and
di¤erent rules for election or appointment of their members.8 For the purpose of this study,
the most important of these local government authorities is the Municipal Corporation.
During the 1860s, the Corporations became the main (public) provider of public health and
sanitation in the boroughs. It was up to them to deal with the challenge of a deteriorating
urban environment and eventually to take action to improve the situation.
2.1 Taxpayer Democracy
The Corporations were governed by the borough councils. The elected councillors were
chosen in yearly elections. The franchise that dened who were eligible to vote was laid
down in the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835 and applied to all boroughs. The franchise
was rmly based on the principle of "no taxation without representation."9 In other words,
an occupier of rated property, who duly paid the local property tax (called the rate),
was, with some qualications, entitled to register for the vote, and, conversely, residents
whose properties were not taxed were automatically disenfranchised. Brian Keith-Lucas
summarizes the precise eligibility requirements as follows
Eligible as a voter was every man who was an inhabitant householder within
a borough or within seven miles thereof and who had occupied any house,
warehouse, counting house or shop within the borough for the previous two
and a half years, provided he had been rated for the whole of that period and
had paid the rates, and was duly enrolled on the Burgess Roll. Those, who,
within the previous twelve months, had received parochial relief or other alms
7Examples include the Poor Law Guardians (poor relief), School Boards (primary education), Local
Boards of Health (health and sanitation), Local Improvement Commissions (sewers, water etc.), Highway
Commissions, and the Municipal Corporations.
8Smellie (1946, chapters 2 and 3) provides a detailed description of the structure.
9Individuals, whether they paid the rate or not, were liable to pay indirect and sometime also direct
(income) taxes to the central government. Thus, the principle of "no taxation without representation"
applied only to taxation at the local level where the rate was the only tax that could be levied.
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[under the Poor Laws] were excluded, and provision was made to enable a
tenant, in cases where the landlord was liable for the rate, to pay them himself
and so quality for the franchise.Keith-Lucas (1952, p. 53, italic added).
[Table 1: The extension of the voting franchise for the Municipal
Corporations in 1852, 1865, 1871 and 1884].
Only local taxpayers who owned personal property or land worth more than a certain
amount were eligible to stand for election (Keith-Lucas, 1952, p. 228). This e¤ectively
excluded the poorer taxpayers from seeking election. Moreover, councillors were unpaid
and were burdened with signicant administrative duties, and meetings were held during
working hours. This, in practice, continued to make it prohibitively costly for many eligible
(working class) candidates to seek election, even after the Municipal Corporation Act of
1882 allowed any enfranchised man to run for election.10
The British Parliamentary Papers contain quantitative information on the number
of registered voters in 1852, 1865, 1871 and 1884.11 We measure the extension of the
franchise as the number of registered voters relative to the adult male population of the
borough.12 These data are shown in Table 1 for a sample of about 75 boroughs. In
1852, only 29 per cent of the adult male population was registered to vote. Through a
sequence of acts of Parliament over the next 50 years, the franchise was gradually extended.
The substantial increase in the proportion of enfranchised individuals between 1865 and
1871 can be attributed to the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869. This act reduced the
residence requirement from two and a half years to one year, and allowed occupiers of
"other buildings" including cottages to qualify for the vote. The Assessed Rates Act of
1869 also contributed to the extension of the local franchise (see below). Szreter (1997, p.
710) suggests these reforms enfranchised a substantial fraction of working-class men. The
10Party politics was limited by the fact that party members stood for election as individuals, but did
play a role in some boroughs (Fraser, 1976, chapter 6; Doyle, 2001).
11This most likely underestimates the true number of eligible voters.
12This base is chosen because the electorate was primary recruited from among the male population.
However, it may be noted that from 1869 onwards unmarried or widowed women were entitled to vote in
local elections.
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extension continued throughout the 1870s and into the 1880s with the Parliamentary and
Municipal Registration Act of 1878 and the Municipal Corporation Act of 1882. By 1884,
64.5 per cent of the adult male population was on the electoral roll.
The data recorded in Table 1 show another important fact about local democracy in
mid-Victorian England and Wales: the franchise was unevenly extended across boroughs.
For example, the "most democratic" borough in 1865 had 82 per cent of the adult male
population on the roll, while the "least democratic" borough had only 11.4 per cent.
By 1884, the spread had narrowed somewhat, but was still substantial.13 Matthew et
al. (1976) argue convincingly that the inter-borough variation in the extension of the
franchise reected exclusion by social class. Boroughs with a narrow franchise e¤ectively
excluded working class men, and boroughs with a very narrow franchise, in addition,
excluded large portions of the middle class. This was achieved through variations in the
fraction of properties in the borough that was, in fact, taxed, but also in two more subtle
ways. First, an important question was whether tenants who paid the local property tax
indirectly through their landlord a practice known as compounding were entitled to
the vote or not.14 Compounding was rst introduced in 1850, but the law was unclear
and practises di¤ered substantially from borough to borough. For example, an attempt
to put compounderson the electoral roll in 1864 in Birmingham was declared illegal by
the courts (Hennock, 1973, p. 11). After the Representation of the People Act of 1867
disallowed the use of compounding, compounding was reintroduction with the Assessed
Rates Act of 1869. This, in principle, enfranchised indirect ratepayers. Nevertheless, their
right to the vote continued to be disputed in the courts. The issue was not settled until
1878 with the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act and nally by a court case
in 1881.15 Second, under the 1835 franchise, a householder was understood to mean an
13Since the standard deviation is roughly constant and the average increases over time, it is clear that
the coe¢ cient of variation is lower in 1884 than in 1852.
14The system was based on the principle that the tax collector accepted an amount less than the whole
tax in return for the landlord, and not the tenant, becoming responsible for the payment. This was a
cost-e¤ective way of collecting taxes from low-value properties.
15Even in boroughs where the principle was accepted, the practical issue of whose name appeared in the
rate book persisted. In cases where the tenants name and not the landlords appeared in the rate book,
the tenant was mostly regarded as being entitled to vote. In cases where the landlords name appeared in
the rate book rather than the tenants, it was much harder for the tenant to get enfranchised. He would
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individual who occupied a separate dwelling. This e¤ectively disenfranchised individuals
who shared a house with others. It was not until 1878 that it was rmly established that
tenants living in shared accommodation could qualify individually for the vote. Until then,
depending on the extent of crowding in particular boroughs and the attitude of the o¢ cials
who draw up the electoral lists from the rate books, a large but varying number of poor
taxpayers was disenfranchised simply because they happened to share a (rated) house with
others. The ambiguities surrounding the status of occupiers of shared accommodation and
indirect taxpayers arguably biased the franchise against the working class.16
2.2 Self-governance and Fiscal Autonomy
As initially envisaged by the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, the activities of the
Corporations were conned to the holding of property, to the regulation of markets and
harbours, to the establishment of policing and lighting systems, and to the making of
by-laws. By 1870, however, many Corporations had became the main provider of urban
infrastructure, sanitation and other health-related urban amenities.17 The responsibility
for drainage, sewage, treatment of waste, paving and street-widening, construction of
cemeteries, reliable supply of clean water etc. had gradually came under the jurisdiction
of the Corporations, either by application to Parliament or by adoption of permissive
general legislation.18 Under the Public Health Act of 1848, towns and districts could, for
example, establish a Local Board of Health. Many Corporations did so and from 1872 acted
as Urban Sanitary Authorities.19 Accordingly, within the boundaries dened by statuary
have to seek permission to substitute his own name for that of the landlord every six months.
16David and Tanner (1996) emphasize di¤erences in administrative e¢ ciency as another source of vari-
ation in who, in practice, got on the Rolls in their study of who qualied to vote for the Parliament in the
late 1860s. Similar problems almost surely arose in relation to registration for local elections.
17Millward and Sheard (1995) estimate that about 90 per cent of all investment in infrastructure,
including investments in sanitation, in England and Wales from 1870 to 1914 were undertaken by local
authorities, including the Corporations, and nanced out of local resources.
18The Corporations were never responsible for three key areas: main roads, primary education and
poor relief, which fell under the Highway Authority, the School Board and the Guardians of the Poor,
respectively.
19The Public Health Act of 1848 permitted a minority of ratepayers 10 % to petition the General
Board to implement the act and set up a Local Board of Health. The Corporation could, if it wished,
implement the act itself or a separate Local Board of Health might be established. The Corporation, if
acting, then had unprecedented powers to borrow, with the consent of the General Board, up to a years
assessable value and to mortgage the rates for 30 years for purposes of improving sanitation and health.
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law and the local tax base, the Corporations had signicant freedom to provide more
services than required and in better quality. In short, progressive Corporations looking
to undertake new activities could generally nd ways of doing so but had to shoulder the
cost themselves (Davis, 2001, p. 264).
The Local Taxation Returns contain detailed information on the nances of the Cor-
porations, starting in the late 1860s. From this source, we construct two measures of
the Corporationsspending on sanitation and other health-related urban amenities. First,
we identify expenditure categories that clearly reect a sanitary function. This includes
spending on sewage, water, streets paving and other similar public works. This measures
spending on urban amenities directly, but does not distinguish between current and capi-
tal expenditures.20 Second, the Corporations could for investment purposes borrow funds
from the capital markets. While many of these were spend on urban amenities, it cannot
be established from the Local Taxation Returns how large this component was. Informa-
tion on borrowed funds, therefore, gives an imperfect estimate of capital expenditures on
urban amenities only.21
We shall use spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds as two alternative proxies
for the Corporationsinvolvement in the provision of health-related amenities. We focus on
a sample of about 75 Corporations in 1868, 1871, 1875, 1886 and 1888. The Corporations
represent a mixture of industrial cities and market towns. We are careful only to include
Corporations that controlled the Local Board of Health from 1868 onwards. This ensures
that the selected Corporations were the main provider of public health in their borough
and that decisions to spend on these services were governed by the franchise rules laid
down for the Corporations.22
The Public Health Act of 1858 made it harder to establish a Local Board, by requiring the approval at a
ratepayersmeeting. The Public Health Act of 1872 replaced the Local Board with the Urban Sanitary
Authority. This could be, and often was, run by the Corporations. The Public Health Act of 1875 nally
required the Corporations to take full charge of health matters in their borough.
20The Local Taxation Returns do not record capital and current expenditures separately until after
1882.
21It is not clear if this is an over- or underestimate. On the one hand, capital expenditures could be
nanced out of current revenue. On the other hand, borrowed funds might have been used for other
purposes than sanitary improvements.
22Where the Corporations did not act as the Local Board, the representatives on the board were elected
on a graduated franchise which, in contrast to the franchise for the Corporations, gave more votes to
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Table 2 records average spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds, either per
capita or in percentage of total spending by year. About 50 per cent of the budget was, on
average, being spent on urban amenities while borrowed funds contributed 15-18 per cent
of income. However, in per capita terms spending on urban amenities more than doubled
during the 1870s. This reects in part the response to mounting pollution and poor public
sanitation. Most strikingly, perhaps, is the fact that the inter-borough variation is persis-
tently high. Some Corporations spend a lot more than others and started doing so much
earlier than others. Although it is not possible to give a detailed breakdown of spending
categories, Bell and Millward (1998) argue that the lions share of sanitary investments
before 1880 was related to water supply. This observation is important. Supply of clean
water, of course, serves an important sanitary purpose23, but water is also a component
of many manufacturing processes. The motivation behind the investment boom in wa-
ter supply in the 1870s might therefore partially have been due to health concerns and
partially have been driven by commercial interest.
[Table 2: Average spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds, 1868-1888.].
The local tax base was rateable property.24 These local property taxes constituted
between 50 and 60 per cent of total revenues for the Corporations.25 In relation to prots,
the property tax fell heavily on small, retail establishments and workshops owned by the
lower-middle class. For house occupiers, who paid the tax directly, it was clearly regres-
sive in tendency because, though rich people generally occupied more valuable property,
they did not do so proportionally to income (Waller, 1983, chapter 6).26 There were, of
occupiers of more valuable properties.
23Insofar as these investments in clean water, as it seems to have been the case, were unaccompanied
by su¢ cient investments in complementary services such as street paving and sewer construction, the
reduction in water-based diseases would be limited because large quantities of contaminated water could
accumulate in ashpits and cesspools. Thus, the health-related benets of these investments might initially
have been limited (see Bell and Millward, 1998).
24All movable wealth, the content of the property as well as income, prots and losses from trade and
employment were not taxable at the local level.
25See Daunton (2001, chapter 9) for more details.
26Until 1925, properties were rated by the 640 Boards of Guardians in 14330 rating areas. Lack of
uniformity across rating areas and lack of professional standards were widespread, and the assessments
were riddled with antiquated and inconsistent procedures and more than a hint of favoritism, particularly
10
course, other sources of income for the Corporations than the local property taxes. In
the late 1870s and 1880s, for example, prots from municipal water and gas works and
tramways became an important source of income in boroughs such as Birmingham, Leeds
and Manchester, which could not rely on incomes from estates as in, for example, Liv-
erpool, Hull, Southampton, and Bristol (Millward, 2001). On the other hand, central
government grants never contributed more than ve per cent of the annual budget, and
the grants were always earmarked for specic purposes, such as police uniforms.
3 The Retrenchment Hypothesis
What accounts for the large di¤erences in spending on urban amenities per capita across
boroughs and across time? Economic and social historians, such as Hennock (1963, 1970)
and Szreter (1988, 1997), have emphasized political factors.27 In his classical comparative
study of Birmingham and Leeds, Hennock (1973), for example, identies the power strug-
gle between "economists" and "sanitarists" as a major source of variation in spending on
urban amenities during the second half of the nineteenth century. The "economists" rep-
resented the interests of middle class ratepayers (shopkeepers, house landlords, and small
manufacturers). They did not wish to pay the cost of poor sanitation as the incidence
of the property tax fell particularly hard on them. The "sanitarists", on the other hand,
advocated municipal involvement in the provision of public health (employment of medical
o¢ cers, building regulation, closure of wells and pits, etc.) and other sanitary improve-
ments (sewers, clean water, slum clearance, street widening etc.). These were recruited
mainly among the urban elite (wealthy capitalists, big manufacturers and professionals).
This group often stood to benet disproportionately from improvements in the urban en-
vironment. In many cases, it was only when local businessmen could see a commercial
advantage of spending on urban amenities that action was taken (Szreter, 1997, p. 708). A
leading example is reliable water supply which had substantial commercial value for many
industries. More generally, local manufacturers beneted commercially from having access
under-assessment of wealthy districts.(Waller, 1983 p. 258).
27See also Fraser (1976), O¤er (1981), and Daunton (2001, chapter 9).
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to a more healthy workforce and better urban infrastructure (e.g., tramways, paved streets
etc.). The balance of power between these two groups was decisive for both the scale and
the timing of investments in public health. Importantly, in whose favor the balance of
power tipped, in turn, depended on the extension of the voting franchise.
Under a restricted franchise, the urban elite could control the councils, and show its
willingness to spend on urban amenities, in particular when it made commercial sense to do
so. Under a moderately extended franchise, middle class shopkeepers, small manufacturers
and landlords, often organized in ratepayersassociations, could control the councils. With
their concern for economy, they kept spending on urban amenities down. Under a wide
franchise, working class men constituted a signicant fraction of the electorate. As under
a narrow franchise, the result was high spending on urban amenities, either because a
cross class alliance between workers and the urban elite brought the "sanitarists" back
into power28 or simply because of the enlarged tax base that allowed the cost of urban
amenities to be spread across more taxpayers. This historical narrative has an important
testable implication which we call the retrenchment hypothesis: the relationship between
spending on local public goods (urban amenities) and the extension of the voting franchise
is U-shaped.
Taxpayer retrenchment was, therefore, intrinsically related to the extension of the
franchise, which, in turn, was determined by a mixture of local and national factors. On
the one hand, the franchise was constituted rather than passively granted and could be
systematically manipulated locally by decisions related to property rating, to the treatment
of compounders and individuals living in shared accommodation, or to the procedures for
registration. These factors are likely to have contributed to the inter-borough variation in
the extension of the franchise. The size of the electorate therefore becomes a function of
local conditions that might also have a¤ected spending decisions directly. On the other
hand, nation-wide reforms, such as the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869 and the Municipal
Corporation Act of 1882, contributed to the enfranchisement of the lower middle and
working class in the 1870s and 1880s. These reforms are unlikely to have been a¤ected
28Working class candidates were e¤ectively excluded from standing for election and so, the working class
voters needed someone to represent their interests in the council.
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directly by the politics of any particular borough. They can therefore be viewed as natural
experiments.
4 A Model of Taxpayer Democracy
In this section, we present a model of taxpayer democracy. The theory generates predic-
tions that are useful in developing a proper test of the retrenchment hypothesis, and we
view it as a necessary stepping stone for the empirical analysis to follow. The model is
designed with the specic institutional framework of mid-Victorian Britain in mind. The
critical assumption is that the urban elite, for a given tax base, wants to spend more
on local public goods than the middle class. In the model this is guaranteed by a com-
bination of three assumptions which are descriptive of mid-Victorian cities. The three
assumptions are: i) the (marginal) benets of local public goods are proportional to cap-
ital endowments, ii) capital endowments are unequally distributed, and iii) the property
tax is regressive. Other combinations of assumptions can, however, be devised to generate
similar results, and we believe that the main results (reported in Propositions 1 to 3) are
valid more generally.
4.1 The Economy
We consider a city populated by wealthy capitalists (H), middle class capitalists (M) and
workers (L). Each wealthy capitalist is endowed with more capital (k) than a middle class
capitalist: kH > kM . Workers are endowed with one unit of labour and no capital. Labour
is supplied inelastically to a competitive labour market. Each group is homogenous and
its size is ni with i 2 fH;M;Lg. We assume that nM > nH and that nL + nH > nM .
Capitalists of type i employ their capital endowment ki and hired labour li to produce
the consumption good Yi. The production technology is
Yi = A(g)`

i k
1 
i ; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where A(:) represents total factor productivity and g is a local public good. Output is
sold in the national market, at price pY = 1. The demand for labour from a capitalist
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of type i is `i = ki(
A(g)
w
)
1
1  . The market clearing wage is w(g) = A(g)z, where z =
(nMkM+nHkH
nL
)1 . Prots earned by each capitalist of type i are i (g) = A(g)kix, where
x = (1  )( nL
nMkM+nHkH
).
Improvements in the health environment of the city is akin to a pure public good.
Although these improvements are created by services, such as clean water, sewage facilities
etc., which to some extend are excludable, the general health benets are non-depletable
and non-excludable. To be concrete, we assume that the urban economy becomes more
productive when the health environment improves and total factor productivity, A (g), is
a strictly increasing and concave function of g. Moreover, local public goods are essential
for production, i.e., A(0) = 0, and A (g) satises the Inada conditions. An important
implication of this is that prots and wages are increasing in spending on local public
goods. Wealthy capitalists, however, benet more from extra spending than middle class
capitalists. This is because the (marginal) benet is proportional to capital endowments.
We assume that workers are poorer than middle class capitalists (z < xkM). Consequently,
they benet the least from extra spending.29 Local public goods are nanced out of local
property taxes.
All citizens have quasi-linear Cobb-Douglas preferences dened over the consumption
good y and housing h:
ui = yi + 
 1hi with  2 (0; 1) : (2)
Capitalists are endowed with two units of housing; workers with none. Each capitalist
consumes one unit of housing privately (their own house) and, if applicable, pay the tax
levied on it ( i) directly. The other unit is supplied to a competitive market for rental
accommodation. Workers spend their wage income on consumption goods and rental
accommodation, i.e., w = yL + qhL where q is the market price of rented accommodation.
Individual demand for housing is hL = q
 1
1  . If rented accommodation is taxed, the
capitalist, who owns the property, pays it on behalf of the worker(s) occupying the property.
In general, the incidence of the tax depends on the relative elasticities of demand and
29This requires that nL > 1 
nMkM+nHkH
kM
. This condition also insures that capitalists do not want to
become workers.
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supply. In the short run, the supply of rented accommodation is xed and the full incidence
falls on the capitalists. In the long run, the stock of housing is variable and the incidence
can be shifted onto workers. As we discuss in detail in Section 4.5, it is not important
for the results how the incidence is divided. For simplicity, we focus on the short run and
keep the supply of rented accommodation xed. In this case, the rental income of each
capitalist is r = q   L where q = n1 L (nH + nM) 1 is the market clearing price and,
if applicable, L is the tax levied on each unit of rented accommodation.30 ;31 Capitalists
spend prots and income from letting net of taxes on the consumption good.
Combining the analysis above, the following policy preference functions emerge:
vi(g) = B + 

i (g)  Ii i   ILL i 2 fH;Mg (3)
vL(g) = C + w
(g); (4)
where B =  1+q and C = (1 )

(q)
 
1  are independent of scal policy. Ii is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if and only if the properties occupied by capitalists of type i are taxed.
IL is equal to 1 if rented accommodation is taxed and 0 otherwise. Workers want spending
on public goods to be high, as they benet from higher wages and e¤ectively to do not
bear the tax cost. Tax-paying capitalists, on the other hand, face a trade-o¤ between
the higher prot earned in a more productive urban economy and the cost of paying the
necessary taxes.
4.2 Politics
The property taxes were regressive. We capture this in the model by assuming that they
are uniformly levied on all rated property and not in proportion to the income of the
occupier.32 Provision of local public goods and the corresponding uniform property tax,
 , is determined by representative democracy. We assume that citizen candidates can
30If L is su¢ ciently large, r could be negative. If so, capitalists must pay (part of) the tax out of
prot income.
31To insure that workers can a¤ord consumption goods, we assume that w > qhL =

nL
nH+nM

.
32In practice, a higher tax was sometimes levied on property of higher value, but this was never su¢ cient
to make the local property taxes progressive relative to the income of the occupier. To keep things simple,
we ignore this detail.
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stand for election to the council only at a cost (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996).33 Payment of local property taxes is a necessary condition for being
allowed to vote and to stand for election; conversely, only enfranchised citizens can be
taxed. We assume that enfranchised citizens vote sincerely and support the candidate
whose platform maximizes their utility.34 The timing of events is:
1. Any enfranchised citizen can decide to stand for election at a group-specic cost
i 2 fH ; M ; Lg.
2. An election is held amongst candidates. The candidate getting the most votes wins.35
3. The winning candidate controls the council. He implements his most preferred policy
fg; g subject to the councils budget constraint. If nobody runs, the default policy
g0 = 0 is implemented.36
In this game, the players are the citizens with the action space "to enter" or "not to
enter". We study subgame perfect equilibria. To simplify the analysis, we assume:
Assumption 1 "H ! 0+ and "M ! 0+
Assumption 2 "L !1
Assumption 1 combined with A(g0) = 0 guarantees that at least one candidate is willing
to stand for election. More importantly, it also guarantees that a candidate favoured
only by a minority of the enfranchised voters cannot gain o¢ ce in an uncontested election
33The citizen candidate model is a natural modelling choice in the context of mid-victorian Britain. It
explicitly acknowledges i) that politicians typically ran as individuals rather than as members of political
parties, ii) that the cost of running played an important role in keeping certain groups out of the councils,
and iii) that politicians in the absence of strong party discipline would nd it di¢ cult to commit to pre-
election promises. The two obvious modelling alternatives, the probabilistic voting model or the median
voter model, do not deal well with these points. The probabilistic voting model assumes stable two-
party politics and that parties can commit to policy platforms. The median voter model is often seen as
institution free. However, it does require that citizens can freely propose platforms and it is ill-suited to
an institutional setting of representative democracy.
34This is similar to Osborne and Slivinski (1996).
35In case of a tie, an unbiased lottery is held amongst the candidates.
36The default policy implies the income of all citizens is zero and that the rental market closes down.
This assumption can be relaxed.
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because potential candidates from the opposition nd it too expensive to run. Assumption
2 implies that workers never run, as it was the case in practise.37
4.3 Three Franchise Regimes
We begin by studying policy outcomes under three (exogenously) given franchise regimes:
H-franchise, HM -franchise and HML-franchise. Under H-franchise only the wealthy
capitalists the urban elite can vote, stand for election and have their property taxed.
Under HM -franchise all capitalists can vote, stand for election and have their property
taxed. Under HML-franchise all citizens can vote and stand for election, and all property,
including rented accommodation, can be taxed. The policy outcomes under the three
regimes can be summarized as follows (see Appendix for details).
Under H-franchise, the wealthy capitalists control the council and decide on spending
and taxation bearing in mind that they cannot share the cost of public goods with the
other groups. Spending on local public goods is gH satisfying
A0(gH)kHx =
1
nH
; (5)
and the property tax is H =
gH
nH
. An extension of the franchise to HM -franchise brings
the middle class into power, as it outnumbers the elite. The middle class benets less from
spending on local public goods than the urban elite, but can take advantage of the broader
tax base (nH + nM). Spending on local public goods is gM satisfying
A0(gM)kMx =
1
nH + nM
; (6)
and the property tax is M =
gM
nH+nM
. Enfranchisement of workers creates a cross-class
alliance between workers and wealthy capitalists. Since it is too costly for workers to stand
for election themselves, they vote for a wealthy capitalist, who can be trusted to spend
more than a middle class capitalist.38 This brings the urban elite back into power and
37Both of these assumptions can be relaxed. The results reported below hold provided "H and "M are
"small" and "L is "large". If not, there exists equilibria in which a minority candidate get elected and/or
equilibria in which a working class candidate stands and gets elected. These equilibria cannot exhibit
retrenchment e¤ects.
38Compared to the Samuelson solution, local public goods are underprovided by a taxpayer democracy
under H- and HM -franchise and continues to be underprovided under HML-franchise if nM (kH   kM ) <

1  (nMkM + nHkH).
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spending on local public goods is gL satisfying
A0(gL)kHx =
1
nH + nM
; (7)
and the property tax is L =
gL
2(nH+nM )
. The rst proposition compares spending levels
under the three franchise regimes.
Proposition 1 (The Retrenchment Hypothesis) Spending on local public goods is higher
under H-franchise than under HM-franchise if and only if
kH
kM
>
nM + nH
nH
: (8)
Spending on local public goods is always higher under HML-franchise than under H- or
HM-franchise.
Proof. SinceA(g) is strictly increasing and concave, equations (5) and (6) imply that gH >
gM if and only if kHkM >
nM+nH
nH
. Moreover, gL > max fgH ; gMg because (nM + nH) kH >
max f(nM + nH) kM ; nHkHg
Whether enfranchisement of the middle class leads to retrenchment or not depends on a
trade-o¤ between two e¤ects. On the one hand, under HM -franchise, the cost of spending
on local public goods can be spread over more taxpayers than under H-franchise. This
tax base e¤ect pulls in the direction of more spending. On the other hand, under HM -
franchise the power of the council falls into the hands of the middle class. It benets less
from spending on public goods than the elite. This benet e¤ect pulls in the direction of
lower spending. Condition (8) guarantees that the benet e¤ect dominates. It requires
large wealth inequalities (large benet e¤ect) and/or a relatively small middle class (small
tax base e¤ect). An extension of the franchise to the working class, in contrast, is always
associated with an increase in spending. This is because the elite returns to power with
the votes of the workers.
4.4 Extension of the Franchise
Above we took the franchise regime as given, leaving aside the determinants of the ex-
tension of the franchise. As discussed in Section 2.1, the boundaries of the franchise were
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in practice determined by two broad factors. Firstly, by not taxing certain properties,
by disenfranchising indirect taxpayers or occupiers of shared accommodation etc., the
boundaries could be manipulated locally. Secondly, nation-wide legislation could force an
extension through. Theoretically, we make a distinction between a voluntary extension of
the franchise that is agreedlocally and a forcedextension that is driven by nation-wide
legislation.
Initially, the franchise of the city only allows wealthy capitalists to vote H-franchise
but subsequently, the middle class and possibly also the working class might become
enfranchised. We say that a franchise extension is voluntary if all citizens are better o¤
under the new franchise regime than under the old, i.e., the new franchise regime is Pareto
superior.39 Voluntary enfranchisement is likely to happen endogenously.40
Proposition 2 (Voluntary enfranchisement of the middle class) HM-franchise is Pareto
superior to H-franchise if and only if
(A (gM)  A (gH)) kMx > M : (9)
A voluntary extension of the franchise to the middle class is always associated with an
increase in spending on local public goods. Moreover, once HM-franchise has been granted,
enfranchisement of the working class cannot be voluntary.
Proof. See Appendix
A voluntary extension of the franchise to the middle class is possible because repre-
sentation is linked to taxation. The elite loses power by granting the middle class the
right to vote, but the tax base is broadened, reducing the cost of local public goods. An
enfranchised middle class gains political inuence, but this comes with the price tag of
39This is a strict denition of voluntary enfranchisement. It requires consent even from citizens who are
only indirectly a¤ected by the extension. The results are, however, identical if we only require that those
who give the vote away and those who receive it (but not other citizens) are better o¤.
40When there is disagreement locally about where the boundaries of the franchise should be drawn,
those in favor of an extension may be able to force it through. However, in this case the losers are likely
to response by evading tax payments. If so, it becomes doubtful if they would be granted the franchise in
the rst place. Such taxpayer revolts are less likely to happen if all parties agreeto the extension (and
to the associated obligation to pay taxes). For this reason, we associate endogenous enfranchisement with
consensus.
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having to share the tax cost. Proposition 2 shows that a voluntary extension is feasible
if and only if the middle class is willing to accept the franchise. A voluntary extension
of the franchise to the middle class must be associated with an increase in spending on
local public goods. Intuitively, if the middle class wants less public goods than the elite,
it does not want to pay for the reduction. An important implication, then, is that middle
class taxpayer retrenchment cannot be the result of a fully voluntary (endogenous) exten-
sion of the franchise. It must be associated with forced enfranchisement. Moreover, once
the middle class has been enfranchised, enfranchisement of the working class cannot be
voluntary because the middle class would lose political power without any compensating
benets and thus be against further democratization.
We say that enfranchisement is forced if all citizens are worse o¤under the new franchise
regime than under the old, i.e., the new franchise regime is Pareto inferior.
Proposition 3 (Forced enfranchisement of the middle class) HM-franchise is Pareto in-
ferior to H-franchise if and only if
(A (gH)  A (gM)) kHx > H   M : (10)
A forced extension of the franchise to the middle class is always associated with a reduction
in spending on local public goods.
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition demonstrates that democratization may be wholly unwanted. The
elite is obviously reluctant to give up control of the council. Less obvious, perhaps, is
the fact that the middle class may not want to accept democratic rights. They sometimes
prefer to forego political inuence in order to avoid paying taxes. Proposition 3 shows that
whenever the elite is unwilling to give away the vote, the middle class would not want to
accept it anyway. Thus, the condition for forced enfranchisement of the middle class is that
the elite values the right to decide on spending more than a broader tax base. Importantly,
a forced extension of the franchise to the middle class is always associated with a reduction
in spending on local public goods; thus making even workers worse o¤. Moreover, if the
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extension from HM -franchise is forced, a further (partially forced) extension to HML-
franchise will always lead to an increase in spending (see Proposition 1).41 Thus, forced
enfranchisement is consistent with the retrenchment hypothesis.
We can gain more insight into the conditions for voluntary and forced franchise exten-
sions by assuming that A(g) = 1

g with  2 (0; 1). With this assumption, we can rewrite
conditions (9) and (10) as follows
nM + nH
nH
>
kH
kM
(1  )  1 (11)
and
nM + nH
nH
<
kH
kM
 
1  
1   kM
kH
! 1 

: (12)
A voluntary extension of the franchise is more likely in cities with a large middle class to
shoulder the tax burden and with little wealth inequality. In contrast, a forced extension
is required to enfranchise the middle class in cities with a small middle class and high
wealth inequality.
Taking together these propositions provide an explanation of the uneven extension of
the franchise observed across mid-Victorian boroughs. The citizens of boroughs with a
relatively large middle class and modest wealth inequalities faced a strong incentive to
enfranchise the middle class and maybe even the working class voluntary:42 all citizens
would benet. In contrast, the citizens of boroughs with a relatively small middle class
and large wealth inequalities all stood to lose from enfranchisement of the middle class.
In those boroughs, the franchise was unlikely to be extended beyond the urban elite in
the absence of nation-wide reforms. Importantly, local decisions to extend or restrict the
franchise are based on a comparison of the size of the tax base before and after and on
relative wealth levels. In contrast, spending decisions for a give franchise is determined
solely by the size of the current tax base and the wealth level of the ruling majority. The
model also shows that the source of middle class retrenchment is forced enfranchisement.
41The extensions from HM -franchise to HML-franchise cannot be fully forced as workers welcome the
increase in spending.
42It can be shown that enfranchisement of the middle and working class is a Pareto improvement if the
middle class is relatively large and wealth inequality is low. A proof is available upon request.
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Only if the franchise is forced upon the middle class, their preference for economy leads
to a reduction in the supply of local public goods. Voluntary extension of the franchise to
the middle class is associated with higher spending, not lower. We shall draw upon these
observations when we develop our empirical test of the retrenchment hypothesis below.
4.5 The incidence of the Property Tax
The assumption that the supply of housing is xed may appear to be too restrictive and
unrealistic. Clearly, in the long run, the supply of rented accommodation reacts to market
forces. As it becomes more elastic, the incidence of the local property tax is shifted onto
workers. Fortunately, the incidence of the tax and thus the distinction between the short
and long run is unimportant for the qualitative nature of the main results.
To see this, suppose that the full incidence of any tax levied on rented accommodation
falls on workers.43 Under HML-franchise workers now want less spending on local public
goods than the capitalists because they benet less at the margin (z < kMx). As a
consequence, they prefer a candidate from the middle class rather than one from the elite,
and a middle class candidate runs and gets elected. Importantly, however, spending is still
higher under HML-franchise than under HM -franchise. This is because the successful
middle class candidate takes advantage of the enlarged tax base. Thus, although the
reason for the increase in spending associated with HML-franchise is di¤erent, condition
(8) continues to determine if the retrenchment hypothesis holds or not, irrespective of the
incidence of the tax levied on rented accommodation.
With respect to voluntary enfranchisement, the only new feature is that the extension
from HM - to HML-franchise can be voluntary in the long run. The middle class is
obviously in favor of such an extension: it keeps power and gains control over a larger
tax base. The elite may appreciate the larger tax base su¢ ciently to also support the
extension. Surprisingly, even workers might agree to pay taxes in exchange for the vote
despite the fact that they cannot gain control of the borough council.44 The long run
43An appendix with the details is available upon request.
44This requires that the successful middle class candidate chooses a spending level that is su¢ ciently
close to the policy that workers would have chosen if they could have decided themselves and that the
spending level under HM -franchise is much lower than this.
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versions of Propositions 2 and 3, then, in addition to conditions (9) and (10), require
a new condition that rules out that the franchise is voluntarily extended from HM - to
HML-franchise, once HM -franchise is granted.
5 Estimation Strategy and Data
We have constructed an unbalanced panel data set with three cross sections (1868, 1871,
and 1886) for the 75 Corporations that had taken control of the Local Board of Health by
1868. In addition to information on spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds and
the extension of the voting franchise, it contains information from the Population Census
and other sources on socioeconomic conditions.45 As with all historical data, the accuracy
can be questioned. We, however, have no reasons to believe that the (in)accuracy of the
scal data is systematically related to the measure of the extension of franchise. While
measurement error in the scal data, then, inates the error variance and may be a source of
heteroskedasticity, we do not suspect this to be an important source of bias. Measurement
error in the registered number of voters is less likely to be a problem. This is because the
borough o¢ cials would have these numbers on record and just needed to do a count to
provide a return. The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of data and sources.
It is useful to start by eyeballing the data. Table 3 shows the number of voters as
percentage of the adult male population, income from property taxes, and spending on
urban amenities in 1871 for 21 boroughs. We have selected the boroughs to match as
closely as possible those included in Williamsons (1990) seminal study on city growth
during the industrial revolution. The boroughs are ranked according to the extension of
the franchise and divided into three equal-sized groups. The retrenchment e¤ect is clearly
visible in the raw data: boroughs with a narrow or a broad franchise tended on average to
spend less on urban amenities than those in the middle. Similar pictures emerge in 1868
and 1886.
<Table 3: The franchise and spending on urban amenities in 21 boroughs, 1871.>
45Missing information on some of these variables reduces the sample to between 55 and 69 boroughs.
23
5.1 Panel Regressions and Results
We begin the econometric analysis by presenting panel regressions of the following type:
git = 1fit + 2f
2
it +Xit + i + t + "it; (13)
where git is investment in urban amenities per capita in borough i at time t, either measured
as spending on urban amenities or as borrowed funds; fit is the number of registered
voters in percentage of the adult male population; Xit is a vector of control variables and
"it captures all unobserved factors. We assume E ("it) = 0. The retrenchment hypothesis
postulates a U-shaped relationship between spending on urban amenities and the extension
of the franchise, or more precisely that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0.
The choice of the ve time-varying included inXit is motivated by the theoretical model.
The size of the tax base plays an important role in the theory. The Population Census
provides information on the number of individuals working in di¤erent occupations. We
have experimented with di¤erent occupation shares and settled on the share of employment
in manufacturing (industrial employment) as the best measure of the size of the tax base.
As an alternative measure we use the average rateable value of properties within the
borough (ratable value). The number of inhabitants per house (population density) is
included to capture di¤erences in population density. This is likely to a¤ect the cost of
provision, but also the demand for services. We include the size of the total population
(population) to capture scale e¤ects. Finally, we include the stock of outstanding debt
(accumulated debt). Since borrowed funds had to be invested in capital projects, the
stock of debt is a reasonable indicator of past spending on urban amenities. It is clearly
important to control for this as the need to spend on urban amenities in the present
depends on how much was spent in the past. Past spending, of course, also increases the
cost of maintenance.46
In addition to these time-varying, observable factors, we control for borough and time
xed e¤ects. These capture unobserved factors within a borough that are constant over
time and common shocks that a¤ect all boroughs in a given year, respectively. Under the
46It is not possible to construct a measure of the stock of urban amenities from past investment ows.
This is because the Local Taxation Returns do not extend back further than 1868.
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assumption that fit is uncorrelated with "it, conditional on observables and xed e¤ects,
we can obtain consistent estimates of 1 and 2 by applying a xed e¤ects estimator
to equation (13). However, regressions with xed e¤ects do not necessarily estimate a
causal e¤ect. One potential problem is omitted time-varying factors that a¤ect spending
on urban amenities in borough-specic ways. Insofar as these factors are correlated with
the extension of the franchise, the xed e¤ects estimator is inconsistent. We deal with this
concern by including shire-specic time trends in the model.
Regressions (1) to (3) in Table 4 (spending on urban amenities) and regressions (6) to
(8) in Table 5 (borrowed funds) contain the main results. These regressions include bor-
ough xed e¤ects, borough and time xed e¤ects, and borough and time xed e¤ects and
shire-specic trends, respectively.47 In all cases, the estimates of 1 and 2 are consistent
with the retrenchment hypothesis and are signicant, at least, at the 10 per cent level.48
Despite some di¤erences in the magnitude of the point estimates, the estimated turning
point ( 1
22
) at around 40 per cent is remarkable stable across specications. This implies
that democratization would have led to a reduction in spending on urban amenities in
boroughs with less than 40 per cent of the adult male population on the electoral roll, and
to an expansion in boroughs with a wider franchise than that. Based on time averages,
about 40 per cent of the boroughs are located below this turning point.
[Tables 4 and 5 to appear here.]
For comparison, in regressions (4) and (9), we report the results from estimations
with pooled OLS.49 These results are also consistent with the retrenchment hypothesis
with a turning point similar to that of the xed e¤ects estimations. More importantly,
in regressions (5) and (10), we reestimate the model on the pooled sample using median
regression techniques. This reduces the impact of outliers that might arise if expenses (or
funds borrowed) for large improvement projects were recorded in a particular year rather
47The estimated standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
48We have tried to include higher order polynomial terms (including a cubic term). These terms are
always insignicant.
49We allow for panel heteroscedasticity and for spatial correlations between the error terms across
boroughs, and the reported standard errors of the parameter estimates are panels corrected standard
errors (PCSEs), as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995).
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than spread over time. We see that it makes little di¤erence. This reduces the concern
that the results are due to outliers.
The time-varying controls are, with the exception of accumulated debt and industrial
employment, only signicant in the pooled OLS regressions and even there, not in all cases.
This is not surprising, as borough xed e¤ects reduce the variation from which the impact
of these variables are estimated to deviations from borough averages. In contrast, it is
surprising to note that the time xed e¤ects are often insignicant. This suggests that
the boroughs were exposed to few common scal shocks. We shall return to this point in
Section 5.2. The shire-specic trends are, on the other hand, highly signicant.
We have preformed many robustness checks.50 Firstly, we have added additional control
variables, including measures of other sources of income than local property taxes, the
growth rate of the housing stock over the previous 10 years, and borough-specic trends.
Secondly, we have introduced scal lags of 5 years. Thirdly, we have balanced the panel.
Fourthly, we have eliminated variables according to a general-to-specic procedure. Fifthly,
we have clustered the standard errors within boroughs and allowed for arbitrary serial
correlation. Finally, we have also estimated the model with random rather than xed
e¤ects and with a Tobit estimator to deal with potential corner solution problems that
arise when some boroughs did not spend anything on urban amenities. The basic results
presented above are robust to all these extensions.
5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates
The panel regressions reported in the previous section only loosely draw on the theoretical
model. In this section, we utilize the theory more systematically to derive restrictions that
can help identify the retrenchment e¤ect. The theory suggests that:
1. The retrenchment e¤ect is associated with forced enfranchisement.
2. The endogenous decision to extend the franchise depends on how far the franchise
has already been extended.
50Tables with all these results are included in the supplementary material at the back of the paper.
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3. The scal choice under a given franchise is determined by the absolute size of the
tax base and by the absolute wealth level of the ruling majority.
4. The endogenous decision to extend the franchise is determined by the relative size
of the tax base and by relative wealth levels.
These observations point to variables that can be used as instruments for the franchise
in the spending equation.51 First, all boroughs were exposed to three nation-wide reforms
with implications for the franchise: the Municipal Franchise Act of 1869, the Assessed
Rates Act of 1869, and the Municipal Corporation Act of 1882. These reforms were in-
troduced precisely in between the three cross sections. The factors behind these reforms
are unlikely to be associated with the politics or scal situation of any particular bor-
ough. Accordingly, these reforms constitute natural experiments and sources of exogenous
variation, and based on observation 1 we can use reform dummy variables as instruments.
Second, observation 2 suggests that lags of the franchise can be used as a instruments.
To be valid, however, the lagged value of the franchise (and its transformations) must
be uncorrelated with (the unobserved component of) spending on urban amenities in the
present. This is a concern because the franchise of the past a¤ects past spending levels
which may, in turn, a¤ect present spending levels. To deal with this, we condition on past
spending levels (accumulated debt) in the equation for current spending. We also use long
lags, namely the franchise in 1852, 1865 and 1871 as instruments for the franchise in 1868,
1871 and 1886, respectively.52 All this makes it plausible that the franchise of the distant
past only a¤ects current spending through its inuence on the current franchise.
Third, observations 3 and 4 suggest that measures of the relative size of the tax base
and of relative wealth levels can be used as instruments for the franchise. The number
of individuals listed as being engaged in commercial activities in the Population Census
in percentage of the number of individuals either listed as being engaged in commercial
51These instruments would also take care of (classical) measurement errors.
52We have tested for serial correlation in the error term of the equation that determines the franchise.
This is di¢ cult to do because the estimated time-demeaned errors are negatively correlated if the true
errors are uncorrelated. An application of the test suggested by Wooldridge (2002, chapter 10), allowing
the current franchise to be a linear or quadratic function of the past franchise, strongly indicates that
serial correlation is not a problem.
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activities or listed as professionals (relative tax base) gives a good indication of the relative
size of the tax base. Finding a reasonable measure of the wealth distribution is more
di¢ cult. However, we can use information on the sums of money raised through income
taxation. The British income tax was levied by the central government from 1842 onwards.
It was based on the source principle and divided income into ve di¤erent schedules (see
Daunton, 2001, p. 185). In particular, schedule D was a tax on prots from trade,
commerce and professions. The percentage of total income tax revenues raised under
schedule D (relative wealth) gives an indication of the share of income earned by the
middle class. Unfortunately, this information is only available at the county level. We
must therefore attribute the county average to each borough within the county.
Given this set of instruments, we estimate the panel model using xed e¤ects 2SLS.53
To economize on the degrees of freedom, we progressively excluded insignicant time-
varying control variables using a general-to-specic approach.54 Table 6 reports the results
for the two specications with spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds.55 The
instruments pass Hansens J test for over-identifying restrictions. All instruments, except
relative wealth, are highly signicant in the two rst stage regressions with high partial
R2 values and a large F-statistics for joint signicance. Most importantly, the estimations
continue to support the retrenchment hypothesis. The estimated turning point is, in line
with the previous results, somewhere in the range between 33 and 44 per cent.
[Tables 6: Results from IV estimation.].
The nation-wide reforms that play an important role in our IV estimations are indistin-
guishable from time xed e¤ects. These must therefore be excluded from the second stage
regressions. As noted in Section 5.1, however, the xed time e¤ects are mostly insigni-
cant, and we feel justied in excluding them. To check the robustness of this, regressions
(16) to (18) include regional-specic time trends. This makes very little di¤erence to the
53The use of these instruments reduces the sample size to 77 observation from 35 boroughs.
54Similar results obtain if we leave all insignicant control variables in the rst and second stage regres-
sions (not reported).
55Since we include the same variables in all regressions, the rst stage regressions are only reported once
in Table 6.
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results.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that local democracy can be a source of retrenchment. In our context, it
is reasonable to suppose that retrenchment and the associated reduction in spending on
urban amenities was socially harmful. In other contexts, it is possible that retrenchment
can be socially desirable, for example by taming a Leviathan government.
From a broader perspective, our analysis shows that franchise extension needs not be
associated with larger government, as otherwise suggested by the theory developed by
Meltzer and Richards (1981) and others. In particular, the tax policy used to nance
public spending plays an important role. While Lindahl (1964) argued that a tax system
linked to marginal benets can foster consensus, our evidence suggests that retrenchment
emerges out of social conict when taxes are broadly unrelated to the benets of spending
but closely linked to political rights.
Recent empirical work on the consequences of the extension of the franchise have fo-
cused on scal and other outcomes at the national level or at the state level in the USA.
While the evidence from US states presented by Husted and Kenny (1997) and Kenny
and Lott (1999) broadly supports the view that national franchise reforms contributed to
the growth of government, the evidence from Western Europe is more complex. Aidt et
al. (2006) nd that the franchise extension had more of an impact on the composition
of spending than on the scale of government. Aidt and Jensen (in Press) show that the
impact of the franchise extension on the composition of taxes depended critically on tax
collection technology, and that the franchise was not associated with growth in direct tax-
ation until tax collection technologies had reached a certain threshold. A similar point is
made by Aidt and Jensen (2007) who show that the probability of adopting income taxa-
tion in Western Europe was, in fact, negatively related to the extension of the franchise.56
For a broader sample of countries, Mulligan et al. (2002) nd little evidence of a linear
56See also Lindert (1994, 2004a,b) for evidence on the link between democratization and social spending,
and Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2005) for a study of the franchise extension in the Americas.
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relationship between democracy and social security policy and stress that countries with
very di¤erent political histories often end up with very similar social security programmes.
Taken together with our nding of retrenchment, this evidence cast doubt on the simply
hypothesis that democratization must be associated with growth government.
The fact that the mid-Victorian Municipal Corporations had considerable scal inde-
pendence combined with the large inter-borough variation in the extension of the franchise
o¤er new opportunities to investigate the interaction between scal choices and the allo-
cation of voting rights. We have focused on one aspect the retrenchment hypothesis 
but the data material can be used to test many other in future research.
7 Data Appendix
The data set has been deposited with the UK Data Achieve (http://hds.essex.ac.uk).
Construction of the data set. The unit of analysis is a Municipal Corporation
in a particular year. The data set covers up to 75 Corporations. The scal data refers
to the scal years ending in 1868, 1871, 1875, 1886 and 1888. The data comes from
the annual reports (the Local Taxation Returns) submitted by each Corporation, Local
Board or Urban Sanitary Authority to Parliament detailing the expenditures and incomes
of the past scal year. We aggregate the accounts of the Corporations with those of
the Local Board for the years 1868 and 1871. For 1874, 1885, 1888, the accounts for
the Urban Sanitary Authority replace those of the Local Board. The Corporations are
selected to maximize sample size subject to the constraint that the relevant Corporation
acted as the Local Board in 1868 (accordingly British Parliamentary Papers, LVI, 1874)
and to data availability. All data is in current prices and refers to a scal year of 12
months. Prices were generally falling during the period. Contemporaneous information
on borough-specic prices is not available. Information on income tax revenues by county
comes from special returns reported in British Parliamentary Papers.
Information on the franchise for the Corporations has been collected for 33 boroughs
in 1852, 63 boroughs in 1865, 73 boroughs in 1871, and 75 boroughs in 1884. The data for
1865 is matched with scal data for 1868, the data for 1871 is matched with scal data
for 1871, and the data for 1884 is matched with scal data from 1886.
The socioeconomic controls are only available from the Censuses by decade. We have
interpolated linearly to match the information to the relevant year. Population data by
age is only available from the Censuses at the municipal borough level for a subset of the
cities for 1861 and 1871. For the some boroughs, the age-specic data are taken from the
relevant registrars sub-district and has been scaled to match the borough totals (as they
appear in British Parliamentary Paper (1871) LIX vol 3 and 4, p. 701-707). A similar
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problem arises when the age-specic data refer to parliamentary boundaries. Data on
employment structure is only available for 30 boroughs in the 1881 Census.
Denitions of variables used in the regression analysis
 Spending on urban amenities is the sum of Public Works and Maintenance and Re-
pairs from the Corporations accounts and Public and Private Improvements Works
from the accounts of the Local Board or the Urban Sanitary Authority. This includes
spending on sewage, water supply, gas supply, highway scavenging and watering and
drainage.
 Borrowed funds is the sum of Money Borrowed on Security of the Rates from the
Corporations accounts and Loans on Security of Rates from the accounts of the
Local Board or the Urban Sanitary Authority.
 Franchise is the total number of individuals on the Burgess Roll divided by the
number of male inhabitants in the municipal borough, aged above 20, times 100.
 Population is the total population in the municipal borough (borough boundaries).
 Population density is the total population divided by the number of inhabited houses
in the municipal borough times 100.
 Industrial employment is the number of male and female workers in the industrial
class (V) in registration districts divided by the number of adult (older than 20 years)
males and females in the registration district, times 100.
 Ratable value is the value of all rated property in the parish or district divided by
the number of properties in the parish or district times 100.
 Accumulated debt is the stock of debt outstanding at the end of the scal year, as
stated in the Corporations accounts and in those of the Local Board or the Urban
Sanitary Authority.
 Relative tax base is the number of individuals listed as being engaged in commercial
activities in the Population Census in percentage of the number of individuals listed
as either being engaged in commercial activities or are listed as professionals.
 Relative wealth is the percentage of total income tax revenues raised under schedule
D.
 Housing stock is the number of inhabited houses in the municipal borough (borough
boundaries).
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 Rents and prots is the sum of Tolls and Dues, Duties, Penalties, Fines and Fees,
and Rents and Prots of Property from the Corporations accounts and Prots from
Water and Gas Works and Income from Markets, Rents, Tolls and Dues from the
accounts of the Local Board or the Urban Sanitary Authority.
[Table A1: Descriptive statistics.]
Sources The data comes from House of Commons British Parliamentary Papers (PP
henceforth). The sources for the scal data are:
 PP (1868-69) "Abstract of the statement of the municipal boroughs in England and
Wales for the year ended 31 August 1868," LII, 149-167.
 PP (1868-69) "Return of the Rates Levied by Local Boards," LII, 377-397.
 PP (1872) "Abstract of municipal borough accounts: Monies raised and expended by
the municipal boroughs of England and Wales, year ended 31 August 1871," XLIX,
149-167.
 PP (1873) "Sums Raised and Expended by Local Boards for the year 1871-72," Local
Board Rates, No. 3.
 PP (1876) "Abstract of the Municipal Borough Accounts, year ended 31 August
1875" Municipal Borough Rates (England).
 PP (1872-73) "Sums Raised and Expended by Urban Sanitary Authorities for the
Year 1872-73," Urban Sanitary Authorities, No. 2.
 PP (1868-69), "Abstract of the statement of the municipal boroughs in England and
Wales for the year ended 31 August 1868," LII, 149-167;
 PP (1886) "Sums Received and Expended by Town Councils Acting as Urban San-
itary Authorities, Year ended Lady-day 1886," Borough Urban Sanitary Accounts,
No. 5.
 PP (1886) "Abstract of the Municipal Borough Accounts, year ended Lady-day
1886," Municipal Borough Accounts, No. 4.
 PP (1888) "Abstract of the Municipal Borough Accounts, Year ended Lady-day
1888," Municipal Borough Accounts, No. 4.
 PP (1888) "Sums Received and Expended by Town Councils Acting as Urban San-
itary Authorities, Year ended Lady-day 1888," Borough Urban Sanitary Accounts,
No. 5.
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 PP (1870) "Return of the amounts of property asses to income and property tax
under Schedules A, B and D in each country in England and Wales and Scotland, in
each of the years from 1864-5 to 1869-70".
 PP (1885) "Return of the income tax under schedule A, B, D, of gross amount of
property and prots assessed in each county of Great Britain in the years 1883-54".
The sources for the franchise data are:
 PP, 1867, LVI (355-433): "Return of the number of registered voters on the list of
all municipal boroughs in England and Wales and of the numbers who voted at the
municipal elections in those boroughs for the year 1852 and all subsequent years."
 PP, 1872, XLVII: "Return showing with respect to each Municipal City and Borough
in England and Wales, the total number of municipal electors on the register now in
force."
 PP, 1884-84. LXVII (23-31): "Return of municipal boroughs in England and Wales,
showing the population, number of inhabited houses, number of persons on the
Burgess rolls, distinguishing men from women."
The sources for the demographic and occupational data are the 1851, 1861, 1871, 1881
and 1891 Censuses and PP (1871) LIX vol 3 and 4, (701-707): "Houses and populations
in the cities and boroughs in England, table VIII: houses and populations in the cities and
boroughs having dened Municipal or Parliamentary limits."
8 Proofs
Characterization of policy outcomes. First, consider H-franchise. Suppose a wealthy
capitalist stands for election and is elected. He implements gH = argmax H(g)  subject
to g = nH where gH satises A0(gH)kHx = 1nH . If no one stands for election, the default
policy is g0 = 0 which yields vH(0) = 
 1. At least one wealthy capitalist will run if
vH(gH)  "H   1 (14)
which is always satised for "H ! 0+.
Second, consider HM -franchise. Suppose a capitalist of type i is elected. He im-
plements gHMi = argmax 

i (g)    subject to g = (nH + nM) where gHMi satises
A0(gi)kix = 1nH+nM . If no one stands for election, the default policy is g0 = 0 which yields
vi(0) = 
 1. At most one candidate from each group stands for election as long as the cost
of running is positive. The entry game has four potential pure strategy equilibria: (A) a
wealthy and a middle class capitalist enter, (B) only a wealthy capitalist enters, (C) only
a middle class candidate enters, (D) no one enters. Since wealthy capitalists cannot win a
contested election against a middle class candidate, simply because nM > nH , congura-
tion (A) cannot be an equilibrium: the wealthy capitalist prefers not to run (same policy
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outcome, but no entry cost). Moreover, for small entry costs, conguration (D) cannot
be an equilibrium either: each type of candidate prefers to enter and implement his most
preferred policy to the default policy. Conguration (B) is an equilibrium if and only if
vM(g
HM
H )  vM(gHMM )  "M (15)
vH(g0)  vH(gHMH )  "H : (16)
Condition (15) fails for "M ! 0+ because vM(gHMM ) > vM(gHMH ). Thus, this cannot be an
equilibrium under Assumption (1). Conguration (C) is an equilibrium if and only if
vM(g
HM
M )  "M  vH(g0) (17)
vH(g
HM
M )  "H  vH(gHMM ): (18)
Both of these conditions are satised under Assumption (1).
Third, consider HML-franchise. Suppose a capitalist of type i is elected. He imple-
ments gHMLi = argmax 

i (g)   2 subject to g = 2(nH + nM) where gHMLi satises
A0(gi)kix = 1nH+nM . If no one stands for election, the default policy is g0 = 0 which yields
vi(0) = 
 1. Worker candidates are never going to stand (Assumption 2) and at most
one candidate from each of the other groups stands for election. While capitalists vote for
a candidate of their own type, workers prefer a wealthy to a middle class capitalist. As
above, only two of the four potential pure strategy equilibria are relevant. Conguration
(B) is an equilibrium if and only if
vH(g
HML
H )  "H  vH(g0) (19)
vM(g
HML
H )  "M  vM(gHMLH ): (20)
Both of these conditions are satised under Assumption 1. Conguration (C) is an equi-
librium if and only if
vH(g
HML
H )  "H  vH(gHMLM ) (21)
vM(g
HML
M )  "M  vM(g0): (22)
Condition (21) fails for "H ! 0 as vH(gHMLH ) > vH(gHMLM ). The Proposition follows by
setting gHMLH = gL and g
HM
M = gM 
Proposition 2. Since the middle class is worse o¤ under HML-franchise than under
HM -franchise, an extension of the franchise from HM - to HML-franchise cannot be
voluntary. Given that, HM -franchise is Pareto superior to H franchise if and only if
(PS)M vM(gM) > vM(gH) (23)
(PS)H vH(gM) > vH(gH) (24)
(PS)L w(gM) > w(gH) (25)
We prove the Proposition in three steps. First, rewrite (PS)M as follows
xkM (A (gM)  A (gH)) > gM
nM + nH
(26)
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which can only be satised if gH < gM . Second, write (PS)M as in equation (26) and
(PS)H as
(A(gM)  A(gH))xkH + gH
nH
>
gM
nM + nH
: (27)
Since (PS)M ) gM > gH , A0 > 0 and kH > kM , we have that (PS)M ) (PS)H . Finally,
since workers like g to be as high as possible, they are better o¤ under a HM -franchise
than under a H-franchise if condition (PS)M is satised. Condition (9) then follows by
rearranging condition (PS)M . To prove the last part of the Proposition, it is su¢ cient to
note that
A(gM)xkM   gM
nM + nH
> A(gL)xkM   gL
nM + nH
(28)
from maximization 
Proposition 3. An extension of the franchise from HM - to HML-franchise cannot
be voluntary. Given that, HM -franchise is Pareto inferior to H franchise if and only if
(PI)M vM(gM) < vM(gH) (29)
(PI)H vH(gM) < vH(gH) (30)
(PI)L w(gM) < w(gH) (31)
We prove the Proposition in three steps. First, rewrite (PI)H as follows
F (gM ; gH) = xkH (A (gH)  A (gM)) + gM
nM + nH
  gH
nH
> 0: (32)
Notice that F (gH ; gH) < 0. Using equations (5) and (6), we can write the total di¤erential
of F as
dF =
kM   kH
(nH + nM) kM
dgM : (33)
It follows that dF
dgM
< 0 and that if F (gM ; gH) > 0, then it must be that gH > gM . Second,
write (PI)M as
xkM (A(gH)  A(gM)) + gM
nM + nH
> 0 (34)
Since (PI)H ) gH > gM and A0 > 0, we have that (PI)H ) (PI)M . Finally, since workers
like g to be as high as possible, they are worse o¤ under a HM -franchise than under a
H-franchise if condition (PS)H is satised. The Proposition then follows by rearranging
condition (PS)H 
References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115 (2000), 1167-1199.
35
[2] Aidt, Toke S., Jayasri Dutta and Elena Loukoianova, "Democracy Comes to Europe:
Franchise Extension and Fiscal Outcomes 1830-1938," European Economic Review,
50 (2006), 249-283.
[3] Aidt, Toke S. and Peter Jensen, "Taxation and the Extension of the Voting Franchise
in Western Europe, 1860-1938," International Tax and Public Finance (In press).
[4] Aidt, Toke S. and Peter Jensen, "The Taxman Tools Up: An Event History Study of
the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax in Western Europe, 1815-1941," Faculty
of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0766 (2007).
[5] Bardhan, Pranab, "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American
Economic Review, 90(2) (2000), 135-139.
[6] Bardhan, Pranab, "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 16 (2002), 185-205.
[7] Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series
Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, 89(3) (1995), 634-47.
[8] Bell, Frances and Robert Millward, "Public Health Expenditures and Mortality in
England and Wales, 1870-1914," Continuity and Change, 13(2) (1998), 221-249.
[9] Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate, "An Economic Model of Representative Democ-
racy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1) (1997), 85-114.
[10] Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duo, "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence
From a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1409-1443.
[11] Congleton, Roger D., "Economic Development and Democracy, Does Industrialization
Lead to Universal Su¤rage? Homo Economicus, 21 (2004), 283-311.
[12] Conley, John P. and Akram Temini, "Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups
Preferences Conict" Journal of Political Economy, 109(1) (2001), 79-102.
[13] Daunton, Martin, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914
(Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[14] Davis, John. and D. Tanner, "The Borough Franchise after 1867," Historical Research,
69 (1996), 306-327.
[15] Davis, John, "Central Government and the Towns," pp. 261-286, in Martin Daunton,
ed., The Cambridge Urban History of Britain vol. III, 1840-1950 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
36
[16] Doyle, Barry M., "The Changing Functions of Urban Government: Councillors, Of-
cial and Pressure Groups," pp. 287-314, in Martin Daunton, ed., The Cambridge
Urban History of Britain vol. III, 1840-1950 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
[17] Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokolo¤, "The Evolution of Su¤rage Institu-
tions in the New World." Journal of Economic History, 65 (2005), 891-921.
[18] Fraser, Derek, Urban politics in Victorian England, (Leicester, UK: Leicester Univer-
sity Press, 1976).
[19] Hennock, Ernest P., "Finance and Politics in Urban Local Government in England,
1835-1900," History Journal, 6 (1963).
[20] Hennock, Ernest P., Fit and Proper Persons: Ideals and Reality in Nineteenth-century
Urban Government (Edward Arnold: London, 1973).
[21] Husted, Thomas A. and Lawrance W. Kenny, "The E¤ect of the Expansion of the Vot-
ing Franchise on the Size and Scope of Government," Journal of Political Economy,
105 (1997), 54-82.
[22] Justman, Moshe and Mark Gradstein, "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transi-
tion, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-century Britain," Explorations
in Economic History, 36 (1999), 109-127.
[23] Keith-Lucas, Brian, The English Local Government Franchise. A Short History (Ox-
ford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1952).
[24] Lindahl, Erik. "Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteurung, Positive Lösung (Just Taxation A
positive Solution)", pp.168-176. Reprinted and translated in Richard A. Musgrave and
Alan T. Peacock (eds.) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (London, MacMillan
& Co, 1964).
[25] Lindert, Peter H., "The Rise in Social Spending 1880-1930," Explorations in Economic
History, 31 (1994), 1-37.
[26] Lindert, Peter H., Growing Public, Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004a).
[27] Lindert, Peter H., Growing Public, Further Evidence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2004b).
[28] Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico, "Why Did the Elites Extend the Su¤rage?
Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britains Age of
Reform," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2) (2004), 707-765.
[29] Lott, John R., and Lawrance W. Kenny, "Did Womens Su¤rage Change the Size and
Scope of Government?," Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1999), 1163-1198.
37
[30] Matthew, H. C. G., R. I. McKibbin and J. A. Kay, "The Franchise Factor in the Rise
of the Labour Party," The English Historical Review, 91(361) (1976), 723-752.
[31] Meltzer, A.H., Richard S.F, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." Journal
of Political Economy, 89(5) (1981.), 914-27.
[32] Millward, Robert and Sally Sheard, "The Urban Fiscal Problem, 1870-1914: Govern-
ment Expenditures and Finance in England and Wales," Economic History Review,
48(3) (1995), 501-535.
[33] Millward, Robert, "The Political Economy of Urban Utilities," pp 315-350, in Martin
Daunton, ed., The Cambridge Urban History of Britain vol. III, 1840-1950 (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[34] Mulligan, Casey, B., Richard Gil and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Social Security and
Democracy" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series no. 8958
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002).
[35] O¤er, Avner, Property and Politics, 1870-1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology and
Urban Development in England (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
[36] Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski, "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-
Candidates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1) (1996), 65-96.
[37] Santos, Boaventura de Sausa, "Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a
Redistributive Democracy," Politics and Society, 26(4) (1998), 461-510.
[38] Smellie, Kingsley B. A History of Local Government (London: Allen & Unwin, 1946).
[39] Stigler, George J., "Directors Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law
and Economics, 13(1) (1970), 1-10.
[40] Szreter, Simon, "The Importance of Social Intervention in Britains Mortality Decline
1850-1914: a Reinterpretation of the Role of Public Health," Social History of Medi-
cine, I (1988), 1-37.
[41] Szreter, Simon, "Economic Growth, Disruption, Deprivation, Disease, and Death:
On the Importance of the Politics of Public Health for Development," Population and
Development Review, 23(4) (1997), 693-728.
[42] Szreter, Simon and Graham Mooney, "Urbanization, Mortality, and the Standard of
Living Debate: New Estimates of the Expectation of Life at Birth in Nineteenth-
century British Cities" Economic History Review, 51(1) (1998), 84-112.
[43] Waller, Philip J. Town, City and Nation, England 1850-1914 (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1983).
38
[44] Williamson, Je¤rey G. Coping With City Growth During the British Industrial Rev-
olution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[45] Wohl, Anthony S. Endangered lives: Public health in Victorian Britain (London:
Dent, 1983).
[46] Wooldridge, Je¤rey, M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
39
Extra material
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9 Extra Appendix I
A fully extended franchise includes workers. Since the middle class, once they have got
the vote, loses from further extensions of the franchise, voluntary enfranchisement of the
working class can only take place through a direct extension from H- to HML-franchise.
Proposition 4 (Voluntary enfranchisement of the middle and working class)HML-franchise
is Pareto superior to H-franchise if and only if
xkM (A (gL)  A (gH)) > 2L: (35)
Voluntary enfranchisement of the middle and working class is associated with an increase
in spending on local public goods.
Proof. HML-franchise is Pareto superior to H-franchise if and only if
(PSD)M vM(gL) > vM(gH) (36)
(PSD)H vH(gL) > vH(gH) (37)
(PSD)L w(gL) > w(gH): (38)
Begin by noting that gL > gH so that (PSD)L is satised. Write (PSD)M as
xkM [A (gL)  A (gH)] > gL
nH + nM
(39)
and (PSD)H as
xkH [A (gL)  A (gH)] + gH
nH
>
gL
nH + nM
: (40)
Since kH > kM and gL > gH , it follows that (PSD)M ) (PSD)H
Enfranchisement of the middle and working class is voluntary if and only if the middle
class is willing to accept the franchise, as this guarantees that the elite and workers also
gain. This requires that the benet associated with the extra spending on local public
goods dominates the cost of having to pay the rates, both on their own house and, through
compounding, on the accommodation they let in the market. Assuming that A(g) = 1

g,
we can rewrite equation (35) to note that voluntary enfranchisement of the middle and
working class is only possible if kH
kM
< 1

and
nM + nH
nH
>

1  kH
kM

  1

: (41)
Intuitively, enfranchisement of the middle and working class is a Pareto improvement if
the middle class is relatively large such that the burden of higher spending can be shared
among more ratepayers and wealth inequality is low. In fact, in cities with su¢ ciently
high wealth inequality ( kH
kM
> 1

) enfranchisement of the middle and working class at the
same time cannot be voluntary.
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10 Extra Appendix II: Tax Incidence
In the main text, we consider the case where workers live in rented accommodation and
the incidence of the rate, if applicable, falls on the landlord (short run). In this appendix,
we show that the results are qualitatively the same if we make the opposite assumption,
namely that the incidence of the tax on the property of workers falls entirely on them (long
run). To this end, we assume that workers own the house they live in (or alternatively
that the supply of housing is innitely elastic). The rest of the model is the same.
10.1 Retrenchment
The equilibrium analysis under H- and HM -franchise is as before with spending deter-
mined by
A0 (gH)xkH =
1
nH
(42)
and
A0 (gM)xkM =
1
nH + nM
: (43)
Under HML-franchise, workers are going to vote for the candidate with the platform
closest to their ideal spending policy. They know that a H-candidate will spend more
than a M -candidate. Since we assume that z < xkM , workers want less spending, for a
given tax base, than any of the capitalists. They, accordingly, support that middle class
candidate. Knowing that a middle class candidate runs and gets elected. He implements
A0 (gL)xkM =
1
nL + nH + nM
: (44)
It is clear that the retrenchment hypothesis is true whenever
kH
kM
>
nM + nH
nH
(45)
as in the short run. To see this note that gL > gM because of the tax base e¤ect associated
with the extension of the franchise to workers. Thus, in the short run, spending goes up
when the working class is enfranchised because of the cross class alliance between the elite
and the working class. In the long run, spending goes up because the middle class gain
access to a larger tax base.
10.2 Voluntary or Forced Enfranchisement
The key di¤erence between the short and long run is the fact that the move from HM -
franchise to HML-franchise can be voluntary in the long run, i.e., supported by all three
groups. When considering the extension from H- to HM -franchise agents anticipate that
further voluntary extension might happen. Moreover, we might observe that the middle
class is always better o¤ under HML-franchise than under HM -franchise: it keeps control
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over the council but has a larger tax base. This implies that HML-franchise cannot be
Pareto inferior to HM -franchise.
We begin with the proposition determining when voluntary enfranchisement of the
middle class is possible.
Proposition 5 (Voluntary enfranchisement of the middle class). HM-franchise is Pareto
superior to H-franchise if
[A (gM)  A (gH)]xkM > gM
nM + nH
(46)
and
gL
nM + nH + nL
> [A (gL)  A (gM)] z (47)
A voluntary extension of the franchise to the middle class is always associated with an
increase in spending on local public goods. Moreover, once HM-franchise has been granted,
enfranchisement of the working class cannot be voluntary.
Proof. Suppose that HM -franchise has been reached. Workers will not agree to further
extensions when
A (gM) z > A (gL) z   gL
nM + nH + nL
: (48)
Given that, the analysis of the welfare implications of an extension from H- to HM -
franchise are as in the short run
We note that condition (47) might not hold, i.e., workers might like to pay taxes despite
the fact that they do not gain control of the council. This can obviously only happen if
the level of spending under HM -franchise is below what they would have liked to spend
had they gained control of the council under HML-franchise:
A0
 
gWL

z =
1
nL + nH + nM
: (49)
Clearly, gWL < gL, so it is only in the interest of workers to accept paying taxes if gL is
su¢ ciently close to gWL and gM is su¢ ciently below this. In this case, paying taxes will
be more than compensated for by the fact that spending moves closer to workersideal
spending level. With A (g) = 1

g, we can write condition (47) as
1  

>
0@1   nH + nM
nH + nM + nL
 1 1A nM + nH kHkM
nL
= F (nH ; nM ; kM ; kH):
The condition that z < x implies that
1  

>
nM + nH
kH
kM
nL
: (50)
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So it is possible that condition (47) fails, even when 1 

>
nM+nH
kH
kM
nL
.
With regard to forced enfranchisement of the middle class, we get the following long
run result.
Proposition 6 (Forced enfranchisement of the middle class) HM-franchise is Pareto in-
ferior to H-franchise if
xkH (A (gH)  A (gM)) > gH
nH
  gM
nH + nM
: (51)
and
gL
nM + nH + nL
> [A (gL)  A (gM)] z (52)
A forced extension of the franchise to the middle class is always associated with a reduction
in spending on local public goods and once it has been forced upon the middle class no further
(voluntary) extension will take place.
Proof. Suppose that HM -franchise has been reached. Workers will not agree to further
extensions when
A (gM) z > A (gL) z   gL
nM + nH + nL
. (53)
Given that, the analysis of the welfare implications of an extension from H- to HM -
franchise are as in the short run
As discussed above, in the long run a 2-step voluntary enfranchisement process is a
possibility.
Proposition 7 (2-step voluntary enfranchisement of the working class). HM-franchise
is Pareto superior to H-franchise and HML-franchise is Pareto superior to HM-franchise
if
(A (gL)  A (gM)) z > gL
nH + nM + nL
(54)
and
(A (gL)  A (gH)) z > gL
nH + nM + nL
: (55)
Proof. Suppose HM -franchise has been reached. It will be extended to HML-franchise
if all three parties agree. Notice that the middle class always agree and that if the working
class agrees, then the elite agrees as well, i.e.,
A (gL) z   gL
nH + nM + nL
> A (gM) z (56)
implies
A (gL)xkH   gL
nH + nM + nL
> A (gM)xkH   gM
nH + nM
: (57)
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Thus, suppose that condition (56) holds, then HML-franchise Pareto dominates HM -
franchise. Anticipating this, a voluntary extension from H to HM requires that all three
groups prefer HML -franchise to H-franchise or
(A (gL)  A (gH)) z > gL
nH + nM + nL
(58)
(A (gL)  A (gH))xkM > gL
nH + nM + nL
(59)
(A (gL)  A (gH))xkH + gH
nH
>
gL
nH + nM + nL
(60)
where it is clear that condition (58) implies conditions (59) and (60)
11 Extra Appendix II: Robustness
Tables B1 and B2 report results from an extensive robustness analysis. With a few
exceptions, we report the results from specications with borough and time xed e¤ects.
Similar, and often stronger, results emerge from the specication with shire-specic trends.
[Tables B1 and B2 to appear here.]
Additional Controls Regressions (1) to (4) of TableB1 show that our results are robust
to the inclusion of two additional control variables. Firstly, the Corporations did have
other sources of income than the rate. In particular, in some boroughs trading prots and
income from markets and harbours were substantial. To test if availability of other sources
of income than the rates a¤ects investments in urban amenities, we include in regressions
(1) and (2) a measure of the fraction of the budget derived from prots and rents (budget
share of rents and prots). The measure itself is insignicant and has minimal impact
on the parameters of interest. Secondly, the rate at which the boroughs were physically
expanding might have a¤ected investments in urban amenities because of changing needs,
but also because an expansion of the stock of housing often a¤ected how the incidence of
the rate levied on rented accommodation was divided between tenant and landlord. To
test this hypothesis, we include in regressions (3) and (4) a measure of the growth rate
of the stock of houses over the previous 10 years. Although the impact is positive and
signicant in one of the specications, the parameters of interest are una¤ected.57 Finally,
above we control for shire-specic trends, not for borough-specic trends. The reason is
that we would have very few degrees of freedom left if we included 55 borough-specic
trends. However, as regressions (5) and (6) show, the results with borough-specic trends
are consistent with the retrenchment hypothesis and not all that di¤erent from the results
with shire-specic trends.58
57A similar result obtains if we use population growth instead (not reported).
58In our sample, 33 shires are represented and at most 10 boroughs are located in the same shire.
44
Fiscal Lags It is unlikely that an extension of the voting franchise has an immediate
impact on scal outcomes. New councilors need to be elected and although a third of
the elected members were up for election each year, it would take at least two years after
an extension of the franchise before a majority of councilors were elected under the new
franchise. As it happens, the regression reported above partially takes such scal lags into
account because of the imperfect overlap between the timing of our cross sections of data
on the total number of voters (1865, 1871, 1884) and our cross sections of scal data (1868,
1871 and 1886). However, we can allow for even longer scal lags by using scal data from
1875 and 1888 instead of data from 1871 and 1886. Regressions (7) and (8) show that
longer scal lags reduces the turning point to around 32 per cent and makes it harder, in
particular in the specication with borrowed funds, to estimate 1 precisely.
Balanced Panel Our panel is unbalanced with 55 boroughs and 2.3 observations on
average per borough. By balancing the panel, we reduce the number of observations to 48
with only 16 boroughs. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the retrenchment e¤ect
comes through even stronger for this sub-sample and that the turning point continues to
be around 40 per cent (see regressions (9) and (10) in Table B1).
General-to-Specic The regression results reported in Tables 4 and 5 include many
insignicant control variables. This reduces the degrees of freedom and may cause prob-
lems of multicollinearity. It is, therefore, of interest to ask what happens if we exclude
insignicant control variables from the analysis. To this end, we adopt a general-to-specic
approach and eliminate iteratively the most insignicantvariable, keeping shire-specic
trends and time xed e¤ects if those are jointly signicant. The results are shows in Table
B1, regressions (11) to (13). In the specication with spending on urban amenities, we
see that industrial employment, rateable value and accumulated debt are signicant. In the
specication with borrowed funds, none of the control variables are signicant if we keep
the sample constant as we test the model down, but rateable value and accumulated debt
are signicant if we allow the sample to expand as we exclude variables. In all cases, the
evidence continues to support the retrenchment hypothesis, with a turning point around
40 per cent.
Clustered Standard Errors and Serial Correlation In all the regressions (except
in the Tobit and in the median regression model), the reported standard errors are robust
to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. In addition to this, we can allow the standard errors to be
robust to correlations between the error terms within clusters (boroughs) and to arbitrary
serial correlation. The results are shown in Table B2, regressions (14) to (21). We see that
our basic results are robust to these corrections. The only case in which the signicance
of 1 drops below the 10 per cent level is in regression (15) with clustered the error
terms. Signicance is, however, regained when insignicant xed time e¤ects are excluded
(regression (16)).
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Random E¤ects Estimates We have focused on the xed e¤ects estimator because
we a priori have strong reasons to believe that the unobserved xed e¤ects are correlated
with our measure of the franchise. If so, the random e¤ects estimator is inconsistent.
In turns out, however, that the Hausman test does not reject the random e¤ects model,
as illustrated by regressions (22) to (24). While the evidence from the random e¤ects
estimator supports the retrenchment hypothesis, we have more condence in the xed
e¤ects estimates. Finally, the random e¤ects model uses "between" as well as "within"
variation to identify the retrenchment e¤ect. We notice from regressions (25) and (26),
which show what happen when the three cross sections are time averaged (the "between"
estimator) that although the signs are correct, the retrenchment e¤ect cannot be identied
from the cross sectional variation alone.59 It is the fact that we observe boroughs over time
that identies the retrenchment e¤ect.
Tobit Estimates Some boroughs did not spend anything on urban amenities or bor-
rowed any funds for investments in urban amenities in some years (see Table A1 in Ap-
pendix). This creates a potential corner solution problem, which may call for the adoption
of a censored Tobit model.60 In regressions (27) and (28), we report the results from such
a model. The evidence continues to support the retrenchment hypothesis, although the
turning point is somewhat lower (36-38 per cent).61
59A similar message comes from seperate cross sectional regressions (not reported).
60See Wooldridge (2002, chapter 16).
61The reported marginal e¤ects should be corrected for the probability that the latent variable is above
0 evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. As this correction is very small and it does not
a¤ect the calculation of the turning point, we do not report it.
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Table 1: The extension of the voting franchise for the Municipal  
Corporations in 1852, 1865, 1871 and 1884. 
 Number 
of 
boroughs 
Mean Standard 
deviation.
minimum maximum
Year      
1852 33 28.6 11.0 11.4 52.3 
1865 63 35.6 14.0 11.5 81.9 
1871 73 57.0 12.8 28.2 81.9 
1884 75 64.2 10.8 33.0 86.7 
All 
years 
244 49.8 18.5 11.4 86.7 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers (see Data Appendix for further details).  
Notes:  The franchise is measured as the total number of registered voters in per cent  
of all male inhabitants, aged above 20, in the borough.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average spending on urban amenities and borrowed funds, 1868-1888. 
 
Number 
of 
boroughs 
Spending on urban 
amenities/total 
spending 
Spending on 
urban amenities 
per 1000 capita 
Borrowed 
funds/total 
revenue 
Borrowed funds 
per 1000 capita 
Year  % St. dev. % St. dev. £ St. dev. £ St. dev.
1868 68 44.8 17.4 14.9 18.4 189.3 319.6 398.6 355.9 
1871 74 45.7 14.2 17.7 19.9 284.7 550.1 453.2 451.6 
1875 74 47.9 13.1 18.3 19.3 434.2 754.2 758.7 817.9 
1886 75 50.5 12.5 17.9 17.9 410.2 708.0 887.4 779.1 
1888 75 48.8 11.1 15.1 16.4 360.0 828.1 850.9 857.5 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers (see Data Appendix for further details). 
Notes: The data refers to the aggregates of the accounts of the Corporations and the Local Boards (1868 and 1871) and the 
Urban Sanitary Authorities (1875, 1886 and 1888). Spending on urban amenities includes spending on sewage, water 
supply, gas supply, streets and other similar public works. Borrowed funds are the sums of monies raised on security of the 
rates during the year. 
 
 
 
Table 3: The franchise and spending on urban amenities in the 21 boroughs, 1871. 
Borough 
Voters in % of 
total 
adult male 
population 
Income from the 
rates per 1000 
capita 
Spending on 
urban amenities per 
1000 capita 
 % £ £ 
  
Group 
means  
Group 
Means  
Group 
means 
Newcastle (upon Tyne) 36.9  415.8  893.8  
Liverpool 41.7  659.0  416.1  
Ipswich 46.9  282.8  342.1  
Southampton 48.9  611.6  248.8  
Gloucester 49.9  638.8  406.2  
Reading 53.6  514.6  768.3  
Sheffield 54.3 47.4 323.4 492.3 194.8 467.2 
Bedford 55.6  610.3  395.9  
Bath 56.1  491.1  377.8  
Exeter 56.6  461.7  233.5  
Wigan 57.0  800.7  322.1  
Preston 57.8  591.1  383.8  
Birmingham 60.0  403.9  248.5  
Macclesfield 61.2 57.7 252.4 515.9 280.7 320.3 
Bradford 61.7  1166.6  1668.4  
Stockport 66.4  384.1  265.1  
York 67.0  337.8  227.6  
Leeds 68.7  1070.0  1365.2  
Coventry 74.3  274.7  218.2  
Gateshead 76.4  420.6  420  
Manchester 79.9 70.6 568.0 603.1 648.5 687.6 
Source: British Parliamentary Papers (see Data Appendix for further details). 
Note: The groups means refer to the average for the boroughs listed in or above the row where the figure appears. 
 
Table 4: Results for spending on urban amenities per (1000) capita.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Estimation methoda Within Within Within Pooled Pooled 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Median 
      
Franchise -28.0** -26.8* -71.7*** -17.9* -16.1* 
 [1.96] [1.65] [4.15] [1.89] [1.97] 
Franchise squared 0.35** 0.36* 0.83*** 0.22** 0.17** 
 [2.08] [1.89] [4.95] [2.29] [2.18] 
Population -0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.001* 
 [0.90] [0.49] [0.87] [1.31] [1.86] 
Industrial employment -2.6 -7.7 -3.5 15.5*** 10.3*** 
 [0.17] [0.37] [0.14] [4.32] [4.02] 
Rateable value -0.0003 -0.02 0.39 0.19*** 0.15*** 
 [0.00] [0.08] [1.37] [3.26] [2.93] 
Population density -3.26 -3.94 -4.33 -0.23 -0.31 
 [0.75] [0.95] [0.66] [0.91] [1.16] 
Accumulated debt 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.18** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
 [4.04] [3.84] [2.08] [4.88] [5.87] 
      
Turning pointe 40.0 37.2 43.2 40.7 47.4 
      
Regional fixed effects no no no yes yes 
χ2 test (p-value)b    0.00 0.13 
Time fixed effects no yes yes yes yes 
χ2 test (p-value)c  0.88 0.14 0.16 0.00 
Shire-specific trends no no yes no no 
χ2 test (p-value)d   0.02   
      
Observations 127 127 127 141 141 
Boroughs 55 55 55 69 69 
Notes: Z statistics in brackets (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, except in (6)); * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a) Regressions (5) and (6) include a constant; b) χ2 test: The null is that all regional fixed 
effects are 0; c) χ2 test: The null is that all time fixed effects are 0;  d) χ2 test: The null is that all shire-specific trends are 
0; e) Turning point = 21 ˆ2/ˆ αα− .
Table 5: Results for borrowed funds per (1000) capita. 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
      
      
Estimation methoda Within Within Within Pooled Pooled 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Median 
      
Franchise  -40.0* -44.5* -125.5*** -29.4** -9.8** 
 [1.78] [1.71] [5.57] [2.14] [2.24] 
Franchise squared 0.50* 0.56* 1.40*** 0.35** 0.09** 
 [1.86] [1.87] [6.36] [2.43] [2.23] 
Population -0.004 0.001 0.019** 0.001 0.001*** 
 [0.63] [0.22] [2.15] [0.77] [3.84] 
Industrial employment 44.0** 22.4 27.5 14.0*** 5.78*** 
 [2.33] [0.85] [0.83] [2.90] [4.03] 
Rateable value 0.30 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.06** 
 [0.60] [0.65] [1.19] [1.15] [2.08] 
Population density -4.7 -7.7 -12.7 -0.20 -0.19 
 [0.98] [1.51] [1.48] [0.63] [1.10] 
Accumulated debt 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.21* 0.11 0.05*** 
 [2.70] [2.60] [1.88] [1.41] [3.00] 
      
Turning pointe 40.0 39.7 44.8 42.0 52.7 
      
Regional fixed effects no no no yes yes 
χ2 test (p-value)b    0.04 0.34 
Time fixed effects no yes yes yes yes 
χ2 test (p-value)c  0.64 0.003 0.67 0.64 
Shire-specific trends no no yes no no 
χ2 test (p-value)d   0.033   
      
Observations 127 127 127 141 141 
Boroughs 55 55 55 69 69 
Notes: Z statistics in brackets (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, except in (12)); * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a) Regressions (11) and (12) include a constant; b) χ2 test: The null is that all regional 
fixed effects are 0; c) χ2 test: The null is that all time fixed effects are 0;  d) χ2 test: The null is that all shire-specific 
trends are 0; e) Turning point = 21 ˆ2/ˆ αα− . 
 
Table 6: Results from IV estimation. 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Stage 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 
Dependent variablea Spending Borrowed funds Franchise
Franchise 
squared Spending
Borrowed 
funds Franchise
Franchise 
squared 
         
Franchise 
(instrumented) -80.7** -141.7*   -72.1*** -101.8*   
 [2.37] [1.67]   [3.04] [1.73]   
Franchise squared 
(instrumented) 0.93** 1.67*   0.95*** 1.52**   
 [2.50] [1.72]   [3.54] [1.99]   
Franchise lagged    1.18*** 132.2***   1.10*** 150.6***
   [3.88] [3.99]   [2.93] [3.94] 
Franchise squared 
lagged   -0.02*** -1.85***   -0.016*** -2.02***
   [5.33] [5.21]   [3.87] [4.62] 
Reform dummy 1869   17.01*** 449.8***   17.5*** 373.3***
   [9.54] [8.36]   [3.73] [2.75] 
Reform dummy 1882   32.95*** 726.4***   32.7** 754.6 
   [8.56] [5.47]   [2.08] [1.58] 
Relative wealth   0.56 109.1*   0.70 74.2 
   [1.08] [1.89]   [0.72] [0.74] 
Relative tax base   0.418** 21.57   0.56 41.6 
   [2.26] [0.83]   [1.50] [1.12] 
         
Industrial 
employment 27.2** 76.9** 0.27 4.84     
 [2.23] [2.57] [0.73] [0.11]     
Accumulated debt 0.18*** 0.23** -0.002** -0.24* 0.22*** 0.35*** -0.002 -0.26** 
 [3.50] [2.41] [2.41] [1.93] [6.04] [3.83] [1.52] [2.10] 
Turning pointb 43.4 42.2   37.9 33.4   
Hansen J Test (p-
value)c 0.46 0.68   0.82 0.93   
F test on all 
instruments   23.9 15.1   9.3 5.8 
p-valued   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Partial R2   78 74   61 58 
Shea partial R2   25 24   32 35 
Region-specific trends no no no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Boroughs 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Notes: Z statistics in brackets (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation); * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a) All regressions include borough fixed effects; b) Turning point = 
21 ˆ2/ˆ αα− ; c) The joint null hypothesis is that the extra instruments are valid; d) p-value for test that all instruments are 
insignificant. The set of instruments is: franchise lagged, franchise squared lagged, reform dummy 1869, reform dummy 
1882, relative wealth, and relative tax base. 
  
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
1868 Obs mean st. dev. min max 
Franchisea 63 35.6 14.1 11.5 81.9 
Spending on urban 
amenities per (1000) capita 
68 398.6 355.9 0 2216.1 
Borrowed funds per (1000) 
capita 
68 189.3 319.6 0 1931.6 
Population 71 56761 62547 6887 350575 
Industrial employment 67 36.9 11.1 17.3 63.5 
Rateable value 58 1731.7 577.6 700.8 3777.7 
Population density 67 558.8 127.5 402.1 1184.8 
Accumulated debt 68 1775.5 2150.5 0 14820.7 
Relative wealth 71 38.9 15.2 14.8 63.8 
Relative tax base 67 58.4 15.9 17.9 88.1 
1871 Obs mean st. dev. min Max 
Franchise 73 56.9 12.9 28.2 81.9 
Spending on urban 
amenities per (1000) capita 
74 453.2 451.6 27.7 2378.6 
Borrowed funds per (1000) 
capita 
74 284.7 550.1 0 3626.5 
Population 74 67896 84379 6915 493405 
Industrial employment 70 36.4 10.8 16.7 61.9 
Rateable value 64 1705.3 599.2 699.1 3532.8 
Population density 73 557.3 122.3 385 1176.8 
Accumulated debt 74 2477.4 2648.6 0 13751.5 
Relative wealth 73 39.1 16.5 7.1 64.1 
Relative tax base 70 59.4 15.8 20.1 89.4 
1886 Obs mean st. dev min Max 
Franchiseb 75 64.2 10.8 33 86.7 
Spending on urban 
amenities per (1000) capita 
75 887.4 779.1 90.5 5915.1 
Borrowed funds per (1000) 
capita 
75 410.2 708.0 0 5026.2 
Population 75 87164.4 98386 7719 538685 
Industrial employment 30 34.7 11.5 7.3 55.8 
Rateable value 75 1939.5 900.5 276.9 6573.8 
Population density 75 547.3 108.7 430.7 1097.6 
Accumulated debt 75 6113.6 5236.2 148.1 21340.9 
Relative wealth 74 44.4 14.6 21.4 65.9 
Relative tax base 30 64.9 12.1 24.7 83.8 
Notes: a) the franchise refers to 1865; b) the franchise refers to 1884. 
 
 
 
Table B1:  Robustness checks I. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent variabled S B S B S B S B S B S B B 
Robustness check New Variable 
New 
variable 
new 
variable 
New 
Variable 
Borough  
specific 
trend 
Borough 
specific 
trend 
Fiscal 
lags 
Fiscal 
lags 
Balan- 
ced 
panel 
Balan-
ced 
panel 
G to Sc G to Sc G to Sc 
              
Franchise  -27.3* -41.8* -24.5* -42.9* -61.2*** -156.9*** -50.8* -37.1 -54.7*** -98.0*** -60.0*** -41.8** -49.2*** 
 [1.67] [1.65] [1.68] [1.76] [4.04] [8.52] [1.65] [1.57] [2.85] [2.59] [4.18] [2.39] [2.58] 
Franchise squared 0.37* 0.51* 0.34** 0.54* 0.87*** 1.9*** 0.76** 0.57** 0.72*** 1.17*** 0.74*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 
 [1.92] [1.77] [2.00] [1.92] [5.40] [9.83] [2.24] [2.27] [3.49] [2.77] [5.31] [3.01] [3.01] 
Population -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.02 0.12*** 0.046 0.043 -0.002 0.011    
 [0.57] [0.55] [0.11] [0.43] [1.08] [5.62] [1.60] [1.48] [0.35] [1.25]    
Industrial employment -6.5 16.2 -6.2 23.5 -104.6*** -134.0*** -43.5 -45.5 -13.9 19.5 -59.8***   
 [0.31] [0.61] [0.30] [0.91] [2.99] [3.15] [1.20] [1.16] [0.76] [0.72] [2.60]   
Rateable value 0.02 0.13 -0.04 0.32 0.82** 1.11** 0.89* 0.87* 0.098 0.887 0.57**  0.13** 
 [0.07] [0.31] [0.16] [0.64] [1.99] [2.22] [1.65] [1.78] [0.34] [1.42] [2.26]  [2.07] 
Population density -3.9 -7.6 -5.2 -8.6 16.5 13.8 -12.9* -7.9 -7.785 -11.792    
 [0.95] [1.52] [1.24] [1.61] [1.45] [1.00] [1.69] [1.09] [1.52] [1.52]    
Accumulated debt 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.26** 0.67* 0.31 -0.20 -0.39 0.736*** 0.14 0.27***  0.13** 
 [3.97] [2.88] [3.62] [2.48] [1.67] [0.63] [0.82] [1.55] [3.78] [0.40] [4.38]  [2.05] 
Budget share of rents 
and profits 2.05 -10.6            
 [0.38] [1.42]            
Growth in housing stock   6.2* 4.3          
   [1.92] [0.95]          
Turning point ( 21 ˆ2/ˆ αα− ) 36.9 41 36 39.7 35.2 41.3 33.4 32.5 38.1 41.9 40.5 40.1 44.7 
              
Time fixed effects yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
χ2 test (p-value)b 0.86 0.78 0.6 0.67 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.001 0.18 0.67 
Shire-specific trends no no no no no no no no no no yes no yes 
Borough-specific trends no no no no yes yes no no no no no no no 
Observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 48 48 127 127 210 
Boroughs 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 16 16 55 55 74 
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects OLS with robust standard errors. Z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a) S = 
spending on urban amenities per (1000) capita, B = borrowed funds per (1000) capita; b) χ2 test: The null is that all fixed time effects are 0; c) general-to-specific.  
 
Table B2: Robustness checks II. 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Dependent variablea S S B B S S B B S S B S B S B 
Estimation methodb FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE RE RE RE BE BE Tobit Tobit 
Robustness check Cluster 
town 
Cluster 
town 
Cluster
town 
Cluster
town 
AR 
robust 
AR 
robust 
AR 
robust 
AR 
robust 
     Corner 
solution 
Corner 
solution 
                
Franchise  -28.0* -26.8 -40.0* -44.5* -28.0* -26.8* -40.0* -44.5* -17.9* -15.9 -31.9*** -15.1 -17.9 -26.7*** -57.1*** 
 [1.88] [1.57] [1.77] [1.68] [1.95] [1.65] [1.78] [1.71] [1.89] [1.52] [2.70] [0.78] [0.74] [2.89] [3.45] 
Franchise squared 0.35** 0.36* 0.50* 0.56* 0.35** 0.36* 0.50* 0.56* 0.26*** 0.23** 0.40*** 0.21 0.21 0.37*** 0.75*** 
 [2.00] [1.80] [1.83] [1.80] [2.08] [1.89] [1.86] [1.87] [2.63] [2.22] [3.46] [1.18] [0.97] [4.00] [4.49] 
Population -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 0.0002 0.003*** -0.002 0.004 
 [1.21] [0.65] [0.61] [0.22] [0.90] [0.49] [0.63] [0.22] [1.59] [1.79] [1.07] [0.32] [3.08] [0.47] [0.66] 
Industrial employment -2.6 -7.7 43.9** 22.3 -2.6 -7.7 43.9** 22.3 11.6*** 12.7*** 12.7*** 16.2*** 9.9* -30.1* 1.63 
 [0.20] [0.37] [2.41] [0.81] [0.17] [0.37] [2.33] [0.85] [3.47] [3.86] [3.45] [3.79] [1.88] [1.92] [0.06] 
Rateable value -0.0001 -0.02 0.30 0.33 -0.0001 -0.02 0.30 0.33 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.14* 0.20** 0.09 -0.20 0.12 
 [0.00] [0.13] [0.76] [0.77] [0.00] [0.08] [0.60] [0.65] [3.16] [3.45] [1.91] [2.39] [0.89] [1.13] [0.42] 
Population density -3.3 -3.9 -4.7 -7.7 -3.2 -3.9 -4.7 -7.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.20 -0.37 -0.52 -1.99 
 [0.72] [0.95] [0.95] [1.47] [0.75] [0.95] [0.98] [1.51] [1.22] [1.30] [0.51] [0.37] [0.57] [0.16] [0.34] 
Accumulated debt 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.38*** 0.17*** -0.07 0.30*** 0.33*** 
 [4.30] [3.97] [2.87] [2.67] [4.04] [3.84] [2.70] [2.60] [4.50] [4.31] [5.60] [3.22] [1.01] [4.45] [2.95] 
                
Hausman test (p-value)         0.3 0.6 0.93     
Turning point ( 21 ˆ2/ˆ αα− ) 40 n.a. 40 39.7 40 40 40 39.7 34.4 n.a 39.9 n.a. n.a. 36.1 38.1 
Time fixed effects no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes 
χ2 testc (p-value)  0.64  0.88  0.65  0.88  0.81 0.01 0.04 0.63 0.16 0.03 
Observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 141 141 127 127 
Boroughs 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 69 69 55 55 
Notes: Z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a) S = spending on urban amenities per (1000) capita, B = borrowed funds per (1000) 
capita; b) FE = fixed effects estimator; RE = random effects estimator; BE = between estimator; c)  χ2 test: The null is that all fixed time effects are 0.
 
